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REGULATORY MORATORIA
KATHRYN A. WATTS†
ABSTRACT
Despite significant scholarly attention given to tools that the
political branches use to exert control over the administrative state,
one emerging tool has gone largely unnoticed: regulatory moratoria.
Regulatory moratoria, which stem from legislative or executive action,
aim to freeze rulemaking activity for a period of time. As this Article
demonstrates, regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the
political toolbox at both the federal and state levels. For example, at
least fifteen federal bills proposing generalized regulatory moratoria
were introduced in the first session of the 112th Congress, and from
2008 to 2011 alone, no fewer than nine states implemented some kind
of executive-driven regulatory moratorium. In addition, beginning
with President Reagan, all U.S. presidents other than George H.W.
Bush have issued short-term regulatory moratoria immediately upon
coming into office to facilitate review of midnight regulations passed
by their predecessors. President Bush, who followed a member of his
own party into the White House, instead implemented a one-year
moratorium during his last year in office.
This Article aims to situate regulatory moratoria within the existing
literature on political control of the administrative state. The goal of
this Article is largely descriptive: to provide the first overarching
description of the emergence of and proposals for regulatory
moratoria at both the federal and state levels and the different contexts
in which regulatory moratoria have arisen. The Article also seeks to
identify and analyze the major arguments for and against regulatory
moratoria from both a legal and a policy perspective. In weighing the
pros and cons of regulatory moratoria, this Article warns against the
use of “hard” moratoria—defined as long-term moratoria often
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spanning a year or more. It also suggests, however, that “soft”
moratoria—meaning short-term moratoria keyed to a brief period of
political transition—might appropriately further notions of
democratic accountability when used carefully by the executive
branch following a change in administration to ensure that the
regulatory machinery is aligned with the policies of those newly
elected to power.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have spent a great deal of time studying various
mechanisms that the political branches use to exert control over the
1
administrative state. One emerging tool for political control,

1. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61
(2006) (examining congressional involvement in the administration of the laws); James F.
Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy
Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 851–52 (2001) (examining centralized presidential
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however, has slipped by largely unnoticed: regulatory moratoria.
Regulatory moratoria, which are also referred to as regulatory
“suspensions” or “freezes,” stem from legislative or executive action,
and they aim to halt or suspend rulemaking activity for a specified
2
period of time.
This Article demonstrates that, far from being an isolated or
novel concept, regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the
political toolbox. Regulatory moratoria now provide a means through
which executive and legislative actors at both the federal and state
levels are either exerting or attempting to exert control over the
3
administrative state.
At the federal level, short-term regulatory moratoria have
become an entrenched feature of the period immediately after a
president takes office. Beginning with President Reagan, upon
coming into office, all presidents excluding George H.W. Bush have

control of regulatory activities and arguing in favor of it); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (examining the “recent and
dramatic transformation in the relationship between the President . . . and the administrative
state”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (arguing that scholars have
underestimated congressional involvement in oversight of administrative agencies).
2. Some regulatory moratoria are subject-specific—meaning that they apply only to
regulations involving specific topics like greenhouse gases or healthcare. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 22,
27th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2011) (resolving that “the Alaska State Legislature calls on the
United States Congress to pass legislation prohibiting the United States Environmental
Protection Agency from regulating greenhouse gas emissions”); S. 23, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2011) (proposing to impose a moratorium on rulemaking with respect to the
implementation and enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code)); Exec. Order No. 2011-03 para. 1 (Idaho Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://gov.idaho.gov/
pdf/Executive%20Order%202011-03.pdf (directing that executive agencies within the state shall
not promulgate “any rule to implement any provisions” of the ACA). Some moratoria also
involve limits on appropriations in the form of targeted riders that prohibit specific regulatory
activity. See generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34354,
CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON RULEMAKING AND REGULATION THROUGH
APPROPRIATIONS (2008) (describing regulatory restrictions in appropriations bills). This Article
focuses only on generalized regulatory moratoria rather than subject-specific moratoria.
3. Although this Article studies only regulatory moratoria in the United States, at least
one other country—Mexico—has imposed a generalized one-year moratorium to boost its
economy. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MEXICO: PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY REFORM 45 (2004) (noting that President Vicente Fox
published a presidential decree in 2004 restricting new regulation until April 2005 and forcing
federal agencies to conduct a review of existing regulations). In addition, in 2011, the United
Kingdom announced a narrower moratorium on new domestic regulation for microbusinesses
and start-ups. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, HM TREASURY, THE PLAN FOR
GROWTH 56 (2011), available at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_growth.pdf.
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issued orders to agency heads to freeze new rulemaking. In addition,
in 1992, a federal moratorium was implemented outside the context
of a change in administration when President George H.W. Bush
ordered what turned into a one-year moratorium in the last year of
5
his presidency. Furthermore, bills proposed in the 104th Congress—
one of which passed in the House—would have imposed a
moratorium on federal rulemaking from November 1994 to
6
December 1995. Later, in the first session of the 112th Congress
alone, at least fifteen bills proposing some kind of a regulatory
moratorium, such as the Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of
7
8
2011, were proposed.
Regulatory moratoria have emerged as a tool for political control
at the state level as well. For example, in 1995, right around the time
that Congress was considering imposing a federal regulatory
moratorium via legislative action, New York’s Republican governor
George Pataki ordered a ninety-day moratorium on new state
9
regulations upon his coming into office, following up on a campaign
10
promise to “be business friendly.” Subsequently, between 2008 and
2011, in the wake of state budget crises and increased economic
uncertainty, state-level regulatory moratoria were implemented in at
11
least nine states : Arizona, Florida, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico,
12
New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.
Given the frequency with which regulatory moratoria are
cropping up at both the federal and state levels, one might expect that
scholars would have studied this emerging tool. Yet—with the
exception of literature discussing moratoria imposed at the federal
4. See infra Part I.A.1.
5. See infra notes 41–66 and accompanying text.
6. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. §§ 3(a), 6(2) (1995);
Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. § 103 (1995); see also 141 CONG. REC.
5880–81 (1995) (noting that 276 representatives voted in favor of the House bill).
7. Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong. (2011).
8. See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
9. Exec. Order No. 2, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 5.2 (1995).
10. Tom Precious, Pataki Tightens Reins on Regulation, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan.
6, 1995, at A1.
11. The phrase “at least” is used very purposefully because the number might be higher.
Although the goal in conducting the research for this Article was to be as exhaustive as possible,
some instances of moratoria or proposals for moratoria may have been missed. This possibility
is heightened at the state level given the difficulty of conducting research involving all fifty
states and the lack of easily searchable, comprehensive electronic databases for some state-level
materials, such as executive orders. See infra notes 379–84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.B.

WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

REGULATORY MORATORIA

4/12/2012 1:22 AM

1887

level by presidents upon a change in political administration to enable
review of so-called midnight regulations, which are regulations issued
13
by an outgoing administration at the eleventh hour —scholars
14
generally have failed to study regulatory moratoria in any depth.
This lack of scholarly attention may be because the use of regulatory
moratoria is still relatively nascent. Furthermore, because regulatory
moratoria involve a significant element of political maneuvering,
some legal scholars may have been quick to dismiss specific proposals
for moratoria as individualized proposals that represent “more
15
symbol than substance” and hence may have missed the bigger
picture. In addition, administrative-law scholars often tend to
approach issues through a federal lens, a tendency that likely has the
effect of obscuring trends, such as regulatory moratoria, that become
16
more apparent when viewed across federal and state lines.
Regardless of the reason for the dearth of scholarly attention, the
lack of scrutiny needs to be remedied given the prevalence with which
executive and legislative actors at both the federal and state levels are
13. For examples of scholarly discussion of presidential reliance on rulemaking
suspensions, withdrawals, or freezes after a change in administration, see Jack M. Beermann,
Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 983–84 (2003); Peter D. Holmes,
Paradise Postponed: Suspensions of Agency Rules, 65 N.C. L. REV. 645, 646 (1987); Thomas O.
McGarity, Jogging in Place: The Bush Administration’s Freshman Year Environmental Record,
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,709, 10,715 (2002); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and
Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 471–72, 473 n.8 (2011); William M. Jack,
Comment, Taking Care That Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory Process Is Faithfully
Executed: A Review of Rule Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions Under the Bush Administration’s
Card Memorandum, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1479, 1483–84 (2002); B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight
Regulations, Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 782, 782 (2003).
14. The only article that treats regulatory moratoria in any detail—outside of the context of
moratoria imposed at the beginning of new presidential administrations—is a piece that focuses
on the impact of a 1992 regulatory moratorium ordered by President George H.W. Bush during
the last year of his presidency. See Scott R. Furlong, The 1992 Regulatory Moratorium: Did It
Make a Difference?, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 254 (1995) (concluding that President Bush’s
moratorium had little impact).
15. Jonathan H. Adler, Misguided Case for Regulatory Moratorium, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 26, 2011, 10:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/09/26/misguided-case-forregulatory-moratorium.
16. Cf. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L REV. 551, 553 (2001) (“[C]asebooks, treatises, and scholarship
harbor a heavy bias towards federal administrative law, relegating state administrative
procedure little, if any, serious attention.”); Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory
Reform: A Comparative Analysis 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper No. 98-3, 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=159578 (noting in a report studying
state and federal regulatory reform that “identification of state regulatory reform provisions
[had been] difficult because no comprehensive source of data exists”).
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attempting to impose moratoria. This Article aims to supply the
remedy by situating regulatory moratoria within the existing
literature on political control of the administrative state and by
providing the first comprehensive discussion of the emergence and
use of regulatory moratoria.
The main goal of this Article is descriptive: to trace the rise of
regulatory moratoria and proposals for moratoria at both the federal
and state levels and to describe the different contexts in which
regulatory moratoria have arisen. Part I demonstrates that when one
looks at both the federal and the state levels, moratoria are cropping
up with increasing frequency and are becoming part of the political
toolbox. As Part I shows, however, these moratoria do not all look
alike. Whereas some moratoria have been driven by the executive
branch, others have been driven by legislatures. In addition, some
moratoria—referred to here as “hard” moratoria—are long-term
moratoria spanning a year or more, whereas other moratoria—
referred to here as “soft” moratoria—are short-term moratoria that
generally last only a few months and are keyed to a period of political
transition.
Part II seeks to identify and weigh the major arguments in favor
of and against hard and soft regulatory moratoria from both a legal
and a policy perspective, and in doing so, Part II offers some
normative assessments regarding the proper use of regulatory
moratoria moving forward. Ultimately, Part II warns against the use
of hard moratoria because they threaten to create protracted
regulatory confusion and evince an antiregulatory bias. In addition, as
a 2011 decision handed down by the Florida Supreme Court
demonstrates, executive-driven hard moratoria raise numerous legal
questions and separation-of-powers concerns relating to whether the
17
executive branch possesses the power to freeze agency rulemaking.
At the same time, however, Part II suggests that soft moratoria—if
crafted to avoid major legal pitfalls—might play a more appropriate
role, helping to further notions of democratic accountability when
used for a brief period of time by the executive branch following a
change in administration. Finally, Part III concludes by identifying
some questions surrounding the use of moratoria that are in need of
future study, including empirical questions about the actual impact of
moratoria.
17. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11–592, 2011 WL 3568804, at *5 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per
curiam) (finding an executive-ordered rulemaking suspension in Florida to be improper).
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF REGULATORY MORATORIA
Since the rise of the modern administrative state and the broad
18
delegation of policymaking powers to agencies, the political
branches have used formal and informal tools for controlling the
regulatory state and reining in agency discretion, including jawboning,
the appointment process, centralized presidential oversight,
19
congressional control of appropriations, and congressional hearings.
Scholars have spent much time studying these and other tools of
political control, with a particular emphasis on presidential control of
20
the administrative state. For example, prominent administrative-law
scholars, including then-Professor Elena Kagan, have studied the
origins of strong presidential oversight of federal agency rulemaking,
21
tracing it back to President Reagan. According to then-Professor
Kagan, President Reagan brought about a “sea change” in terms of
increased presidential oversight of the regulatory state by “selfconsciously and openly adopt[ing] strategies to exert” his influence
22
over the regulatory state.
Despite extensive scholarly attention given to political control of
the administrative state, the extant literature has largely failed to
identify regulatory moratoria as an emerging tool for political control.
This Part describes the emergence of regulatory moratoria as a tool
for control at both the federal and state levels, taking care to
differentiate between moratoria issued by the legislative and
executive branches and between two very different kinds of
moratoria: what will be called “soft” and “hard” moratoria. Soft
moratoria are defined here as short-term moratoria limited to brief
18. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2253 (“[A]s the administrative state grew and then the New
Deal emerged, Congress routinely resorted to broad delegations . . . .”).
19. See supra note 1.
20. See Beermann, supra note 1, at 64–65 (noting that the phenomenon of presidential
control of the administrative state “has received significant attention in legal academia,”
especially in comparison to congressional control); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50 (1994) (arguing
against the proposition that the Founders did not intend to have a strong unitary executive);
Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) (arguing that in the context of the “ordinary world
of domestic administration” the president’s role is to oversee, rather than decide, regulatory
matters); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944 (1980) (analyzing judicially imposed restrictions on ex parte
contacts in formal rulemaking and evaluating whether such restrictions should extend to
informal rulemaking).
21. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2277–78.
22. Id. at 2277.
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periods of political transition. By contrast, hard moratoria are defined
here as long-term moratoria that span a year or more and that are not
limited to brief periods of political transition.
A. Moratoria at the Federal Level
The concept of imposing a generalized regulatory moratorium
seems to have originated with President Reagan. At the beginning of
his presidency, Reagan imposed a temporary regulatory moratorium
to enable review of the midnight regulations issued by the outgoing
23
Carter administration. Since then, several different regulatory
moratoria have been implemented at the federal level. So far, all of
these federal rulemaking moratoria have stemmed from presidential
rather than legislative command, and all but one have been soft
24
moratoria coming at the beginning of new administrations.
Nonetheless, Congress has considered legislative proposals for hard
moratoria on numerous occasions, and—even though none of these
legislative proposals has become law—one such proposal did pass the
25
House in 1995. All of this federal activity is described here,
beginning with the history of soft and hard executive-driven
moratoria at the federal level and then turning to various legislative
calls for hard moratoria.
1. Executive-Driven Moratoria. Executive-driven moratoria at
the federal level have arisen in two very different contexts to date:
(1) numerous soft moratoria implemented at the beginning of new
presidential administrations, as occurred when Presidents Reagan,
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama entered the White House; and
(2) one hard moratorium issued by President George H.W. Bush in
the fourth year of his presidency in 1992.
a. Presidentially Driven Soft Moratoria. On January 29, 1981,
President Reagan—immediately upon coming into office—issued a
memorandum to designated heads of executive agencies titled
26
“Memorandum Postponing Pending Federal Regulations.” In the
23. See infra Part I.A.1.
24. See infra Part I.A.1.
25. See infra Part I.A.2.
26. President Ronald Reagan, Memorandum Postponing Pending Federal Regulations,
PUB. PAPERS 63 (Jan. 29, 1981). Before issuing the memo, President Reagan did obtain the
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel as to the legality of the order. See Presidential
Memorandum Delaying Proposed and Pending Regulations, 5 Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 (1981)
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memorandum, President Reagan directed agency heads—to the
extent permitted by law and subject to certain specified exceptions—
to “postpone for 60 days” the “effective date of all regulations” that
had been “promulgated in final form and that [were] scheduled to
27
become effective during such 60-day period.” In addition, he
directed agencies “[to] refrain, for 60 days following the date of this
28
memorandum, from promulgating any final rule.”
President Reagan justified the order by stressing that one of his
priorities was to “establish[] a new regulatory oversight process that
[would] lead to less burdensome and more rational federal
regulation,” and he explained that the postponement of pending
regulations would enable him to review the “prior Administration’s
last-minute decisions that would increase rather than relieve the
29
current burden of restrictive regulation.” He also noted that this
review of pending regulations was “especially necessary in the
30
economic climate we have inherited.”
Subsequently, on February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued
31
Executive Order 12,291, which created a formal regulatory review
process using the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
32
which called for cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking. To
permit reconsideration of pending rules in accordance with the terms
of Executive Order 12,291, the order called for the postponement or
suspension of “the effective dates of all major rules” that had been
promulgated in final form as of the date of the order but that had not
33
yet become effective.
Through the combination of Executive Order 12,291 and his
prior January memorandum, President Reagan seems to have
pioneered the idea of a soft, executive-driven regulatory moratorium
keyed to a brief period of political change. Indeed, “[s]ince Reagan,
every president taking over from a president of the opposing political
party,” namely Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, has

(concluding that the president has the “authority to direct executive agencies to postpone
proposed and pending regulations for a 60-day period”).
27. Reagan, supra note 26, at 63.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
32. Id. §§ 3(d), 6–7, 3 C.F.R. at 129, 131–33.
33. Id. § 7(a), 3 C.F.R. at 131–32.
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“ordered a similar regulatory moratorium.” These short-term
moratoria generally have been viewed and justified as tools for
presidents to control the phenomenon of midnight rulemaking by the
prior administration—a term that refers to the spike in new
35
regulations that takes place at the end of a presidential term.
For example, President Clinton’s order noted that it was
“important that President Clinton’s appointees have an opportunity
36
to review and approve new regulations.” Likewise, President
Obama’s memorandum noted that it was “important that President
Obama’s appointees and designees have the opportunity to review
37
and approve any new or pending regulations.” And President Bush’s
memorandum explained that the president had requested the
moratorium “[i]n order to ensure that the President’s appointees
ha[d] the opportunity to review any new or pending regulations”—
although President Bush, unlike the others, also hinted at a
deregulatory purpose by noting at the very end of the memorandum
that independent agencies were welcome to voluntarily participate
“in the interest of sound regulatory practice and the avoidance of
38
costly, burdensome, or unnecessary regulation.”
Specifically, all of the moratoria issued by Presidents Clinton,
George W. Bush, and Obama involved a freeze on new rules until the
new rules had been approved by an appointee of the new president,
as well as the withdrawal of final rules that had been sent to the
34. Jerry Brito & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations and Regulatory Review, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 189 (2009); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32356, FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN OVERVIEW 22 (2004) (describing moratoria as “a
technique that has been used to assert control over the rulemaking process, particularly for an
incoming presidential Administration,” beginning with the Reagan administration).
35. On the existence, causes, and problems of midnight rulemaking, see generally CURTIS
W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34747, MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND A NEW ADMINISTRATION (2008); Jack M. Beermann,
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 352 (2009), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/9/LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf; Beermann, supra
note 13; Brito & Rugy, supra note 34; Christopher Carlberg, Early to Bed for Federal
Regulations: A New Attempt To Avoid “Midnight Regulations” and Its Effect on Political
Accountability, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 992 (2009); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After
Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing
Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441 (2005); Sanford, supra note 13.
36. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section 1(d)
of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993).
37. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).
38. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
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Federal Register but that had not yet been published. In addition,
President Bush ordered—and President Obama suggested but did not
mandate—the temporary postponement of the effective date of
regulations that had been published in the Federal Register but that
40
had not yet taken effect. Hence, since President Reagan, every
president taking over the White House from an opposing political
party has frozen the regulatory machinery when transitioning into
office by using a short-term rulemaking freeze combined with the
withdrawal of unpublished regulations or the postponement of the
effective dates of final regulations.
b. President Bush’s Hard Moratorium in 1992. President George
H.W. Bush seized on the concept of a regulatory moratorium in a
very different and much broader context than had President Reagan.
Specifically, when the economy was floundering in 1992, President
Bush ordered what began as a ninety-day moratorium while he was
running for reelection during what turned out to be the last year of
41
his presidency. The moratorium, which was set forth in a
memorandum titled “Reducing the Burden of Government
Regulation,” requested that agency heads—to the maximum extent
“permitted by law” and subject to certain exceptions—spend ninety
days evaluating existing regulations and eliminating unnecessary and
42
burdensome regulations rather than promulgating new regulations.
Unlike the soft moratorium that President Reagan had issued in 1981
upon coming into office, which served primarily “to undo midnight
regulations issued by the Carter administration, to wrest control of
the bureaucracy, and to set the tone for the new administration’s view
of the regulatory process,” President Bush’s moratorium more overtly
39. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 4435 (ordering a freeze on new rules and the withdrawal of regulations that had not been
published); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7702 (same); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of
Agencies Described in Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6074 (same).
40. Compare Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7702 (suspending for sixty days the effective dates of final
regulations that had already been published), with Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4435 (urging agencies to “consider” extending the
effective dates of final regulations for sixty days).
41. See President George Bush, Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government
Regulation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 166 (Jan. 28, 1992); see also President’s Regulatory Moratorium,
ADMIN. L. NEWS, Spring 1992, at 4 (describing President Bush’s moratorium).
42. Bush, supra note 41, at 167 (directing agencies to “refrain from issuing any proposed or
final rule” during a ninety-day period).
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claimed to address the country’s economic woes through reduced
43
regulation.
Another aspect of President Bush’s moratorium differentiated it
from the regulatory moratoria issued by other presidents at the
beginning of their administrations: whereas the moratoria issued by
Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama had all
been issued relatively quietly in a behind-the-scenes fashion,
President George H.W. Bush repeatedly highlighted his moratorium
to the public. For example, the first President Bush announced the
moratorium publicly and associated it with his plans for economic
recovery during a State of the Union Address before Congress in
January 1992, stating, “We must have a short-term plan to address
our immediate needs and heat up the economy. And then we need a
longer term plan to keep combustion going and to guarantee our
44
place in the world economy.”
President Bush succeeded in getting his moratorium noticed by
the public, but initial reaction to the moratorium included significant
opposition by those who were “cynical,” with some suggesting that
45
the program was “simply an election-year ploy” and a political
46
“gimmick.” For example, the New York Times reported that
although President Bush had been “anything but hawk-eyed against
Government rules” in the first three years of his presidency, the
moratorium represented a sharp reversal of course “at the outset of
[the] election year, with the economy flagging, the business
community demanding relief and the right wing of the Republican
47
Party challenging [the president’s] ways.”
48
Not all reactions to the moratorium, however, were negative.
Numerous members of the House of Representatives called on

43. President’s Regulatory Moratorium, supra note 41, at 4.
44. President George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 156, 159 (Jan. 28, 1992).
45. President’s Regulatory Moratorium, supra note 41, at 8.
46. David E. Rosenbaum & Keith Schneider, Bush Is Extending Regulation Freeze as a
Great Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at A1; see also Douglas Jehl, Bush Extends His
Suspension of New Government Regulation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A32 (“[A]s Bush
spoke of taking a ‘wrecking ball’ to rigid government rule-making, senior officials inside the
White House hinted at another motivation when they referred to new polls showing public
distaste for such regulation.” (quoting President Bush)).
47. Rosenbaum & Schneider, supra note 46.
48. See id. (“Michael J. Boskin, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and a
coordinator of the review process, said, ‘In this 90-day period alone, dozens of regulatory
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President Bush to extend the moratorium for one year. They
asserted that “increasing Federal regulations require[d] private
enterprises to expend a growing level of resources to meet regulatory
mandates, rather than investing in new capital [or] expanding
50
operations, therefore inhibiting the creation of new jobs.”
Ultimately, President Bush chose to extend the moratorium,
announcing before cameras during an April 1992 address from the
Rose Garden that he was “ordering a 120-day extension of the
51
moratorium on new regulations,” thereby turning the moratorium
52
from a three- to a seven-month freeze on rulemaking. In justifying
the extension, President Bush—flanked by White House officials,
including Vice President Dan Quayle and White House Counsel
Boyden Gray—proclaimed the ninety-day moratorium to be a
resounding success, and he argued that “[t]o ensure that recovery
continues and is strengthened, to ensure that we can create new jobs,
53
we must continue our course of regulatory reform.” Specifically, he
claimed, “We estimate that the reforms we’ve set in motion just since
January 28 will save consumers about $15 billion to $20 billion a year.
That’s a savings of $225 to $300 per year for the average American
54
family.”
These claims of victory did not go unchallenged. Indeed, during
the very Rose Garden ceremony in which President Bush was
55
declaring success, the Bush administration’s celebration was derailed
when “Fred Krupp, the executive director of the Environmental
Defense Fund, unexpectedly stepped to the microphone and
denounced the extension of the regulatory moratorium as a sell out to

reforms and initiatives were taken that removed unnecessary obstacles to business expansion
and job creation.’” (quoting Boskin)).
49. H.R. Con. Res. 307, 102d Cong. (1992).
50. Id.
51. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 663,
664 (Apr. 29, 1992); see also Andrew Rosenthal, Outsider Steals Bush’s Rose Garden Scene,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A18 (“In its drive to convey the image of a President offering an
agenda for the future, the White House sent President Bush into the Rose Garden today for a
much-advertised announcement on what he called ‘one of my top priorities’—Government
deregulation.” (quoting President Bush)).
52. A video of President Bush announcing the extension can be found on C-SPAN’s
website. See Regulatory Moratorium Announcement, C-SPAN (Apr. 29, 1992), http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/25791-1.
53. Bush, supra note 51, at 664.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 665.
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56

big business.” Specifically, Krupp, who had “helped the Bush
Administration draft its position on acid rain during negotiations on
the 1990 Clean Air Act,” asserted that the freeze was a “‘wholesale
handout to the American business community’ at the expense of
57
clean air and water.” Krupp’s statement reportedly left two of the
58
president’s top aides “fuming.”
Outside the context of the Rose Garden ceremony, much of the
controversy surrounding President Bush’s moratorium centered on
how much impact, if any, the moratorium was actually having—with
many attacking the veracity of the president’s claims of billions in cost
savings per year. Some policy analysts argued that the moratorium
had “had little visible effect in reversing the sharp growth of
59
regulation during the first three years of [Bush’s] Presidency.” In
addition, Public Citizen, a national nonprofit consumer group
founded by Ralph Nader, decried President Bush’s claim of cost
60
savings as “pure voodoo accounting,” arguing that the moratorium
was “costing the nation dearly in human life and a damaged
61
environment” rather than saving money. Specifically, Public Citizen
and OMB Watch asserted that “[n]o claim of savings from the
moratorium should be counted until the administration shows how it
got its numbers, and until the costs to public health and safety and to
62
the environment of not regulating are also factored in.”
Despite all of the controversy, President Bush stood behind his
regulatory moratorium. In fact, he continued calling public attention
to it as he faced reelection, stating, for example, during his acceptance
speech at the Republican National Convention in August 1992 that he
would further extend the moratorium for one year through August

56. Robert V. Percival, Separation of Powers, the Presidency and the Environment, 21 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 25, 40 (2001).
57. Rosenthal, supra note 51 (quoting Krupp).
58. Id.
59. Robert D. Hershey Jr., Regulations March On, Despite a Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1992, at D1.
60. NANCY WATZMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH & CHRISTINE TRIANO, OMB
WATCH, VOODOO ACCOUNTING: THE TOLL OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S REGULATORY
MORATORIUM, JANUARY–AUGUST 1992, at v (1992).
61. Id. at i.
62. NANCY WATZMAN, PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH & CHRISTINE TRIANO, OMB
WATCH, THE HIDDEN STORY: WHAT BUSH AND QUAYLE DON’T SAY ABOUT THE
REGULATORY MORATORIUM 4 (1992).
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63

1993. After the convention, a White House spokeswoman clarified
that the “announcement at the convention had functionally
64
extend[ed] the moratorium,”
and Vice President Quayle
subsequently followed up more formally by issuing a memorandum to
all department heads stating that agencies “should continue to follow
the procedures and substantive standards established” in the
65
Hence, President Bush’s
president’s original memorandum.
experiment with an executive-driven moratorium ultimately lasted
one year in all, and it would have continued until at least August 1993
66
had President Clinton not been inaugurated in January 1993.
2. Legislative Calls for Hard Regulatory Moratoria. After the use
of executive-driven regulatory moratoria in 1981 and 1992, it was
perhaps just a matter of time before Congress too would start
thinking about regulatory moratoria. And this is indeed exactly what
happened. Beginning in the 1990s, various legislative proposals for
hard regulatory moratoria surfaced in Congress. As this Section
describes, though none of these legislative proposals has been enacted
into law, their mere introduction suggests that Congress has taken

63. See President George H.W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at
the Republican National Convention in Houston, 2 PUB. PAPERS, 1380, 1384 (Aug. 20, 1992) (“I
believe that small business needs relief from taxation, regulation, and litigation. And thus, I will
extend for one year the freeze on paperwork and unnecessary Federal regulation that I imposed
last winter.”).
64. Regulatory Moratorium Remains in Effect Despite Lack of Official Bush Memorandum,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Sept. 1, 1992, at 170, available at LEXIS, Doc. No. 1992 DER 170 d20.
65. Quayle Sends Memo Reminding Agencies To Comply with Regulatory Moratorium,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Dec. 4, 1992, at 234, available at LEXIS, Doc. No. 1992 DER 234 d33
(quoting Quayle).
66. Even though it appears that President Bush is the only president to date to have
ordered a long-term regulatory moratorium outside the context of a political transition,
President Obama reportedly gave the strategy some consideration. Specifically, according to the
New York Times, in the fall of 2011, President Obama—when faced with an ailing economy and
a bid for reelection—considered proposing a regulatory moratorium on some regulations that
especially affected the economy. Jeff Zeleny, A Campaign Challenge: Defining Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, at A24. The president’s aides, however, promptly denied the New York
Times report. Sam Stein, White House Denies Reports It’s Considering Regulation Moratorium,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:39 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/
07/obama-jobs-speech-regulation-moratorium_n_952168.html. In addition, at least one
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, Governor Rick Perry of Texas,
campaigned “calling for a six-month moratorium on federal business regulations that he said
were holding back job growth nationally.” Rick Perry Touts Jobs Record Ahead of 2012,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:05 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/
rick-perry-jobs-record_n_927271.html.
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note of the executive’s use of regulatory moratoria as a potential tool
for political control of the administrative state.
a. Legislative Proposals in the 1990s. On April 8, 1992, a
concurrent resolution was proposed in the House that would have
expressed Congress’s view that the president should extend for one
year the provisions of his ninety-day moratorium on unnecessary new
67
federal regulations. This resolution ended up being unnecessary
because President Bush extended his moratorium for another 120
68
days without the passage of any formal legislative prodding.
Subsequently, after Republicans swept the 1994 midterm
elections and gained control of both houses of Congress, the new
Republican leaders wrote a letter to President Clinton in December
1994, urging him to issue an executive order that would impose a
moratorium on new rules for the first one hundred days of the 104th
69
Congress. President Clinton responded to the Republican leaders’
demands via a letter from Sally Katzen, the administrator of the
70
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In that letter,
Katzen noted President Clinton’s opposition to imposing a hard
regulatory moratorium, asserting that “a moratorium is a blunderbuss
71
that could work in unintended ways.”
Undeterred by President Clinton’s response, House Majority
Whip Tom DeLay, along with numerous other Republicans, decided
to take matters into his own hands by introducing a bill on January 9,
72
1995—House Bill 450, the Regulatory Transition Act of 1995 —
73
calling for a legislatively imposed regulatory moratorium.
Reportedly, the bill had initially been drafted by Gordon Gooch, a
lobbyist for the petrochemical industry who was part of Project

67. H.R. Con. Res. 307, 102d Cong. (1992).
68. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
69. Melissa Healy, GOP Seeks Moratorium on New Federal Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1994, at A32; see also Peter Grier, GOP Hopes To Unspool Government Red Tape,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1994, at 1 (“The GOP, in fact, is pushing the White House
to freeze all new rules for 100 days . . . .”).
70. Letter from Sally Katzen, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, to Rep. Newt Gingrich (Dec. 14, 1994), available at http://archives.clintonpresidential
center.org/?u=121594-letter-from-katzen-on-regulatory-moratorium.htm.
71. Id.
72. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. (1995).
73. Id. § 2.
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Relief, a corporate lobbying movement that aimed to roll back
74
government regulation.
As introduced in the House, section 2 of the bill set forth
congressional findings, concluding, for example, “that effective steps
for improving the efficiency and proper management of Government
operations . . . will be promoted if a moratorium on new rulemaking
75
actions is imposed and an inventory of such action is conducted.”
Then section 3 went on to set forth the specific terms of the proposed
moratorium, declaring that federal agencies could “not take any
regulatory rulemaking action” until June 30, 1995, unless the
76
rulemaking was exempted from the act through a specific exception.
Section 5 provided specific exemptions, making clear that the
moratorium would not apply to rulemaking actions “necessary
because of an imminent threat to health or safety or other
77
emergency” or “necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws.”
In the debate over the bill, the executive-driven moratoria of
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush were cited as precedent. A
representative from Illinois, for example, noted that “[r]egulatory
moratoria are not new” and that “Presidents Reagan and Bush each
had a moratorium on regulations”—although the proposed bill would
have gone even further than the prior executive-driven moratoria
78
had. In addition, testifying before a House committee considering
the bill in January 1995, former White House Counsel Boyden
Gray—who had stood by President Bush’s side in the Rose Garden
when the president extended his 1992 moratorium—pointed out that
[i]n 1981 and again in 1992, [a moratorium had] permitted the White
House to tell agencies, look, take a look at all the existing rules that
you haven’t revisited in a decade or two or three and redirect some

74. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values
Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 733, 743 (1996); see also Martin Walker, Licence To Pollute the Free World, GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 6, 1995, at 4 (“Gordon Gooch, who lobbies for the petrochemical industry,
drafted the first effort—a moratorium on any new federal regulations of any kind.”).
Representative DeLay apparently acknowledged that “lobbyists offered suggestions for the
regulatory reform bill, but [took] issue with assertions that they ‘drafted’ the legislation in his
office.” Argument Turns to Shove, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 10, 1997, at A7.
75. H.R. 450 § 2.
76. Id. § 3(a).
77. Id. § 5(a)(2).
78. 141 CONG. REC. 5645 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cardiss Collins).
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of your attention, at least for a little time, on reevaluating existing
79
rules.

Ultimately, the bill passed the House by a vote of 276 to 146
80
approximately a month and a half after being introduced. But the
81
Senate counterpart to House Bill 450—Senate Bill 219 —did not fare
so well. Senate Bill 219, which was originally introduced on January
12, 1995, called for a moratorium on regulations, subject to specified
exemptions, that would last until the summer of 1995—a proposal
82
similar to that of House Bill 450. A hearing on the bill was held in
February 1995 before the Senate’s Committee on Governmental
83
Affairs, and one common theme that emerged among detractors
during the hearing was the concern that a moratorium might be too
blunt. For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman opened the hearing
by stressing the broad bipartisan consensus that the regulatory
process needed reform, but he argued that “to just say, ‘stop’
endangers a lot of values and undercuts one of the fundamental roles
of government, which is protection of the public from threats that
84
they cannot protect themselves from.” Similarly, Sally Katzen of
OIRA argued that a moratorium would be a “distraction” and a
“detour” from the real goal of improving the regulatory system
because it would spawn numerous questions, such as questions about
85
the meaning of the exceptions to the moratorium.
In contrast, supporters argued that a moratorium made good
sense because it would force agencies to review and do away with
unnecessary regulations that burdened the economy and industry. For
example, a representative from the trucking industry supported the
moratorium, asserting that “Federal regulators are strangling

79. The Regulatory Transition Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Econ.
Growth, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight,
104th Cong. 160 (1995) (statement of C. Boyden Gray, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering).
80. 141 CONG. REC. 5880 (1995); see also John H. Cushman Jr., House Votes To Freeze
Regulations as Democrats Fail To Gain Health and Safety Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1995, at 7 (“The House of Representatives voted today to freeze most new Federal regulations
for the rest of the year, with Republicans and Democrats arguing to the debate’s bitter end over
whether the proposal would endanger the public.”).
81. Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. (1995).
82. Id.
83. S. 219—Regulatory Transition Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995).
84. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
85. Id. at 8 (statement of Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget).
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transportation in this country” and that “[t]he Federal rulemaking
process has spun out of control and it is costing American jobs,
86
strangling small businesses, and raising prices for every one of us.”
In March 1995, the Senate committee reported favorably on the
87
bill and recommended some amendments. A minority of the
committee, however, argued against the moratorium, concluding that
although “[w]e should fix the regulatory process, we should not freeze
88
it and the benefits that flow from it.” In the end, the general
sentiment expressed in the minority report—that regulatory reform
was needed but that a moratorium was not the right way to achieve
it—won out when a major amendment was proposed to the bill
providing for a forty-five-day congressional review of certain federal
89
regulations instead of a generalized moratorium. This amended
90
version of the bill, which passed the Senate by a vote of 100 to 0, did
not call for a hard moratorium, as did the House bill, but rather
proposed that certain significant regulations—defined essentially in
91
terms of economic effect —would require a forty-five-day
92
congressional-review period before taking effect. Although the
Senate’s version of the bill could be seen as calling for a moratorium
because it proposed to suspend the effective date of certain significant
regulations pending a congressional-review period, it was not a true
93
moratorium in any sense of the word. Hence, the House’s desire to
86. Id. at 39 (statement of Thomas J. Donohue, President and Chief Executive Officer,
American Trucking Association, Inc.).
87. S. REP. NO. 104-15, at 1–3 (1995).
88. Id. at 32.
89. 141 CONG. REC. 9312–14 (1995).
90. 141 CONG. REC. 9580 (1995).
91. See Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. § 106(2) (1995) (defining
“significant rule[s]”).
92. Compare Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. § 3(a) (1995)
(“Until the end of the moratorium period, a Federal agency may not take any regulatory
rulemaking action, unless an exception is provided under section 5 [of this bill].”), with S. 219
§ 103 (noting that “significant” rules may only take effect after a forty-five-day review period).
93. See 141 CONG. REC. 13,265 (1995) (statement of Rep. William F. Clinger, Jr.) (arguing
that the Senate version of the moratorium was, “frankly, hard to characterize as a regulatory
moratorium”); id. at 13,266 (statement of Rep. Colin Peterson) (noting that the Senate bill
provides “for a different approach, which is not all bad, which asks for a congressional review
period for new regulations”); President William J. Clinton, Statement on Senate Action To
Reject a Regulatory Moratorium, 1 PUB. PAPERS 416, 416 (Mar. 29, 1995) (asserting that a
forty-five-day congressional review period—“not the blunt instrument of a moratorium”—was
“the right way to reform regulation”). Consistent with this sense, federal and state bills and
statutes calling for the extension or suspension of the effective dates of regulations to enable
legislative review of regulations are not treated as regulatory moratoria for purposes of this
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impose a long-term regulatory moratorium on federal regulations
failed. Still, the Senate’s desire to institute a congressional-review
period to enable Congress to consider whether to affirmatively
disapprove significant rules—via a joint resolution passed by both
houses and presented to the president—was eventually codified in the
94
Congressional Review Act.
b. Legislative Proposals in the First Session of the 112th Congress.
After the spurt of legislative activity in the mid-1990s focusing on
95
regulatory moratoria, congressional attention given to the topic
tapered off, with very few legislative proposals involving regulatory
96
moratoria surfacing between 1996 and 2010. But after the economy
again took a turn for the worse and many voters began voicing

Article. In contrast, short-term, executive suspensions of the effective dates of regulations to
enable executive review are treated as regulatory moratoria for purposes of this Article. The
reason for this different treatment of legislative suspension of the effective date of a regulation
and executive suspension is as follows: When the legislative branch, via a statute like the
Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006)), extends the point at which certain regulations can become effective
in order to enable review of a regulation, see id. sec. 251, § 801(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)) (mandating a waiting period before a “major rule” can take effect), it
does not impose a moratorium on regulatory activity in general but rather merely statutorily
defines the effective date of the covered regulations. For example, no one would argue that
Congress has implemented a moratorium by providing that substantive rules shall not be
effective until at least thirty days after the required publication of the rule has occurred. See
Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006) (“The required publication or
service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date . . . .”).
94. Congressional Review Act, 110 Stat. 868. The issue of congressional review of
regulations came to the forefront again in the 112th Congress when Republicans proposed
legislation that would halt all new major regulations until the regulations had been affirmatively
approved by Congress—rather than simply giving Congress the chance to disapprove significant
regulations, as the Congressional Review Act does. See Regulations from the Executive in Need
of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10, 112th Cong. § 801(b)(1) (2011) (“A major rule shall not take
effect unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval . . . .”). This bill passed the
House in December 2011 and was sent to the Senate. See 157 CONG. REC. H8237 (daily ed. Dec.
7, 2011) (noting that 241 representatives voted in favor of the bill).
95. See, e.g., S. 219 (requiring a review period before a “significant rule” can take effect);
H.R. 450 (proposing a moratorium on federal rulemaking); Stop Regulating Our Small
Businesses Act of 1995, H.R. 839, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a moratorium on regulations
related to small businesses).
96. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1649, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing an amendment to House rules
to establish a House Committee on Regulatory Review and American Jobs that would
(1) review all final and proposed federal regulations to determine whether such regulations
would result in the loss of U.S. jobs, and (2) impose a moratorium on such regulations);
Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing that midnight rules—defined as
agency rules adopted within the final ninety days of the final term a president serves—“shall not
take effect until 90 days after [a new] agency head [has been] appointed by the new President”).
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97

concerns about overregulation, this quiet period came to an end in
the 112th Congress, when moratoria burst back onto the legislative
agenda. Specifically, in the first session of the 112th Congress alone,
at least fifteen bills introduced by Republicans called for the
98
imposition of a generalized regulatory moratorium.
In January 2011, Representative Don Young, a Republican from
Alaska, introduced House Bill 213, the Regulation Audit Revive
99
Economy Act of 2011 (RARE). The ten-page bill proposed to
impose a regulatory moratorium for at least two years after the date
100
of enactment with some specified exceptions. Its language borrowed
heavily from House Bill 450 and Senate Bill 219 from the 104th
101
Congress.
At least fourteen additional legislative proposals calling for
regulatory moratoria followed over the course of the next nine
102
months in the Senate and the House. These bills, with titles such as
103
the Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011 and the
104
Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011, were
similar in the sense that they all proposed generalized moratoria. Yet
four distinct issues seemed to divide the various bills into different
camps.
First, the bills differed regarding the length of their proposed
moratoria. Many of the bills specified a set period of time for a
97. For a description of polls demonstrating rising concerns about overregulation and the
economy, see infra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.
98. This number counts bills introduced in the House or in the Senate as unique bills—
meaning that a bill introduced in the House and the same counterpart bill introduced in the
Senate are counted as two different bills.
99. Regulation Audit Revive Economy Act of 2011, H.R. 213, 112th Cong. (2011).
100. Id.
101. Compare Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, S. 219, 104th Cong. (1995), with
Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. (1995).
102. H.R. 3518, 112th Cong. (2011); Jobs Through Growth Act, H.R. 3400, 112th Cong.
(2011); Long-Term Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2011, S. 1786, 112th Cong. tit. VI
(2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257, 112th Cong. (2011); Jobs Through Growth
Act, S. 1720, 112th Cong. (2011); Job Creation and Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, H.R. 3194,
112th Cong. (2011); Stop the Regulation Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong.
(2011); H.R. Res. 402, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th
Cong. (2011); Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011, H.R. 2898, 112th
Cong. (2011); Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531, 112th Cong. (2011);
Regulation Moratorium and Jobs Preservation Act of 2011, S. 1438, 112th Cong. (2011);
Restoring Economic Certainty Act of 2011, H.R. 1281, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulation
Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. (2011).
103. H.R. 3181.
104. H.R. 2898.
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proposed moratorium, such as a one- or two-year period. In
contrast, a few bills called for a moratorium keyed to the country’s
106
unemployment rate. For example, the Regulation Moratorium and
107
Jobs Preservation Act of 2011 called for a moratorium on any
significant new federal regulations until the national unemployment
108
rate had fallen to 7.7 percent or below.
Second, the bills differed as to whether only major or significant
rules should be covered, or whether all rules—regardless of their
significance—should be targeted. Many bills targeted only significant
regulations, including regulations that would have an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more or that would “adversely affect
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State,
109
local, or tribal governments or communities.” In contrast, other bills
declined to impose any kind of a significance threshold. For example,
one bill covered all regulations “that would affect employment
110
levels,” and another bill banned agencies from putting into force
111
“any rule,” with narrow, specified exceptions.
Third, the bills differed as to which otherwise-covered
regulations should be exempted from the reach of a moratorium.
Most of the bills recognized the need to provide some exemptions or
112
waivers, but the bills differed in terms of the types and scope of
105. See, e.g., H.R. 3518 § 1 (proposing a two-year moratorium); S. 1786 § 603 (proposing a
one-year moratorium); H.R. 3257 § 3(2) (proposing a moratorium to last until January 21,
2013); H.R. 3194 § 4(3) (proposing a moratorium with an end date of January 20, 2013); H.R.
3181 § 6(3) (providing for a minimum of a two-year moratorium); S. 1538 § 3 (proposing a oneyear “time-out” period for regulations); S. 1531 § 2 (proposing a two-year freeze on new rules or
regulations); H.R. 1281 § 6(2) (proposing a moratorium that would last until the end of the
“two-year period beginning on the date occurring 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act”); H.R. 1235 § 2 (proposing a moratorium through January 31, 2013).
106. See, e.g., H.R. 3400 § 202(a) (“No agency may take any significant regulatory action,
until the Bureau of Labor Statistics average of monthly unemployment rates for any quarter
beginning after the date of enactment of this Act is equal to or less than 7.7 percent.”); S. 1720
§ 3503(a) (same); H.R. 2898 § 3(a) (same); S. 1438 § 3(a) (same).
107. S. 1438.
108. Id. § 3(a).
109. S. 1538; accord H.R. 3400 § 201(3); S. 1720 § 3502(3); H.R. 3194 § 4(2); H.R. 2898
§ 2(3)(A); S. 1438 § 2(3).
110. H.R. 3518 § 1.
111. Regulation Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (emphasis
added).
112. H.R. 3518 is an example of a bill that fails to provide exemptions. It proposes a
moratorium that apparently would cover all rules “that would affect employment levels”—
without any specified exceptions. H.R. 3518 § 1.
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specified exemptions. Many of the bills exempted regulations that
would be necessary “due to an imminent threat due to human health
113
or safety, or any other emergency” or regulations that would be
114
“necessary for the enforcement of a criminal law.” Some of the bills
exempted regulations that would foster job creation or economic
115
growth; others exempted rules pertaining to agency organization,
116
management, or personnel matters; and a few contained exemptions
117
for regulations involving civil rights. In addition, some of the bills
included exemptions for regulations pertaining to military or foreign118
affairs functions, as well as regulations limited to interpreting,
119
implementing, or administering the Internal Revenue Code.
Finally, the bills differed as to whether they would create private
120
rights of action. Many of the bills said nothing about this question.
113. H.R. 2898 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(B); accord H.R. 3194 § 3 (providing for exemptions in cases of
“an imminent threat to human health or safety, or any other emergency”); Stop the Regulation
Invasion Please Act of 2011, H.R. 3181, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2011) (providing for
exemptions in emergencies as certified by the administrator of OIRA); Regulation Audit
Revive Economy Act of 2011, H.R. 213, 112th Cong. § 4(a) (2011) (establishing an “emergency
exception”); see also H.R. Res. 402, 112th Cong. (2011) (exempting rules that “provide for
emergency services or the defense of the Nation”); H.R. 3400 § 203 (“The President may waive
the application of [the moratorium] to any significant regulatory action, if the
President . . . determines that the waiver is necessary on the basis of national security or a
national emergency . . . .”); H.R. 2898 § 4 (same); S. 1438 § 4 (same).
114. H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(B); H.R. 2898 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(B); H.R. 213 § 4(a); accord H.R. 3181
§ 3(a)(2)(B).
115. See H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(C) (exempting regulations that have as their principal effect
“fostering private sector job creation and the enhancement of the competitiveness of workers in
the United States” or “encouraging economic growth”); cf. H.R. 2898 § 2(3)(A) (defining
“significant regulatory action[s]” to which the moratorium applies as, inter alia, those actions
that “adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, [or] jobs”).
116. E.g., Restoring Economic Certainty Act of 2011, H.R. 1281, 112th Cong. § 6(3)(B)(ii)
(2011) (exempting regulations “that are limited to agency organization, management, or
personnel matters”).
117. See, e.g., H.R. 3181 § 3(c) (noting that the regulatory moratorium would not apply to
rulemaking or rules that “establish or enforce any statutory rights against discrimination on the
basis of age, race, religion, gender, national origin, or handicapped or disability status except
such rulemaking actions or rules that establish, lead to, or otherwise rely on the use of a quota
or preference based on [those characteristics]”); H.R. 213 § 4(c) (same).
118. See H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(D) (exempting regulations that pertain “to a military or foreign
affairs function”); H.R. 1281 § 6(3)(B)(i) (same).
119. H.R. 3194 § 3(a)(1)(E); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th Cong.
§ 4(a)(1)(E) (2011).
120. See, e.g., H.R. 3518, 112th Cong. (2011); Long-Term Surface Transportation Extension
Act of 2011, S. 1786, 112th Cong. tit. VI (2011); Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257,
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3194; H.R. 3181; Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531,
112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Moratorium Act of 2011, H.R. 1235, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Of those that did, some allowed private rights of action, stating that
“[a]ny person that is adversely affected or aggrieved by any
significant regulatory action in violation of this Act is entitled to
121
judicial review.” In contrast, other bills expressly disallowed such
actions, stating that “[n]o private right of action may be brought
122
against any Federal agency for a violation of this Act.”
Neither the Senate nor the House has come together behind any
of these bills. Nor have the bills managed to gather bipartisan
momentum. Nonetheless, they demonstrate that legislative proposals
for regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the legislative
consciousness, with Republicans in Congress introducing the bills.
B. Moratoria at the State Level
State executives and legislatures have also started looking to and
relying upon both hard and soft regulatory moratoria as means of
exerting control over state regulatory activity.
1. Executive-Driven Moratoria in the States. Similar to the
moratoria at the federal level, most state-level moratoria have
followed from executive orders rather than legislative command. As
this Section describes, most of these executive moratoria have been
soft rather than hard moratoria. Some state moratoria that started out
as soft moratoria, however, have been transformed into hard
moratoria. In addition, a few governors, including Washington
Governor Christine Gregoire and Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval,
have chosen to call outright for hard moratoria spanning a year or
more.
a. Soft Gubernatorial Moratoria. In the mid-1990s—on the heels
of President Bush’s one-year moratorium on federal regulation in
123
1992 and around the time that the 104th Congress was considering
124
legislation to impose a moratorium on federal regulatory activity —
some governors experimented with imposing short-term moratoria
upon coming into office. One prominent example of this phenomenon
occurred in New York, where on January 5, 1995, the newly elected
121. Jobs Through Growth Act, H.R. 3400, 112th Cong. § 204(b) (2011); Jobs Through
Growth Act, S. 1720, 112th Cong. § 3505(b) (2011); Regulation Moratorium and Jobs
Preservation Act of 2011, S. 1438, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011).
122. H.R. 1281 § 7; H.R. 213 § 7.
123. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 73–95 and accompanying text.
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governor, George Pataki, implemented a ninety-day moratorium,
banning the “adoption of any rule or regulation” by any agency over
125
which he had control with certain specified exceptions. Although
Governor Pataki, a Republican, issued the order after taking the
governor’s office out of Democratic hands, he did not justify the
moratorium in terms of a general need to review regulations issued by
the prior administration. Rather, he justified it in economic terms.
Specifically, he noted that “excessive rules and regulations have
unduly burdened the State’s economy and imposed needless costs on
the businesses and citizens of this State,” and he stressed the need to
“review all proposed rules and regulations to ensure that no rule or
regulation is more demanding than required to meet legislative
126
goals.” Governor Pataki had campaigned on a promise to “be
business friendly,” and according to news reports, the moratorium
127
was a means of following up on his campaign promise. Indeed,
business leaders reportedly hailed the move “as the first step to a
128
better business climate.”
Governor
Pataki
subsequently
determined
that
his
administration could not complete a review of all regulations within
the ninety-day period, and he extended the initial freeze through
129
September 1995 via subsequent orders. This meant that his initial

125. Exec. Order No. 2, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.2 (1995); see also GEORGE
E. PATAKI, MESSAGE TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (1995) (announcing to the legislature that he
would sign an “Executive Order declaring a moratorium on all new regulations—except
regulations needed to protect the public health and safety or rules that promote new jobs and
economic activity”); Patricia E. Salkin, News from the States, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring
1995, at 8, 8 (noting that Governor Pataki ordered a moratorium on proposed rules and
regulations via his second executive order).
126. Exec. Order No. 2, tit. 9, § 5.2.
127. See Precious, supra note 10 (“Living up to his campaign promise to be business
friendly . . . Gov. George Pataki on Thursday placed a 90-day moratorium on new regulations
being issued by state agencies.”); see also Patricia Salkin, Regulatory Reform Continues To
Dominate Political Agenda in New York, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 10, 10
(“When Governor George Pataki campaigned for office, he promised regulatory relief and
reform to the businesses and local governments in the State.”).
128. Jessica Ancker, Business Leaders Hail Pataki Order, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1995, at A12.
129. See Exec. Order No. 7, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.7 (1995) (extending
“Executive Order No. 2 in full force and effect up to and including June 30, 1995”); Exec. Order
No. 14, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.14 (1995) (extending “Executive Order No. 2
in full force and effect up to and including Sept. 30, 1995”); see also Pataki Aims To Cut into
Some Red Tape, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Dec. 2, 1995, at B2 (noting in December 1995
that even though the Pataki administration’s “moratorium on issuing new regulations” was over,
agencies would face a “rigorous set of guidelines designed to discourage the creation of too
much governmental red tape”); Michael Slackman, Pataki’s Regulatory Revolution, NEWSDAY,
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soft moratorium ultimately morphed into a longer-term freeze that
was coupled with numerous other initiatives designed to achieve
130
regulatory reform, such as a focus on cost-benefit analysis.
On January 25, 1995—around the same time that Governor
Pataki issued his initial moratorium in New York—Rhode Island’s
newly elected Republican governor, Lincoln Almond, issued an order
131
just days after taking the governorship out of Democratic hands. In
the order, Governor Almond declared “a moratorium on the issuance
of any new regulations” so that “each department can assess the need
for all current regulations and eliminate or modify those which are
132
not warranted.” Like Governor Pataki, Governor Almond justified
the order largely in terms of improving the economy and combating
overregulation, asserting that “a strong and growing economy is
essential to job formation and the well-being of Rhode Island” and
that “government over-regulation poses a threat to the health of
133
Rhode Island businesses.”
Since 2002, many more governors have imposed short-term
regulatory moratoria in their states immediately upon coming into
office. And they too have all either expressly or implicitly pointed to
concerns about the economy, unnecessary burdens, or overregulation
when freezing rules at the beginning of their new administrations.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in California was one such
governor. Immediately upon coming into office in November 2003,
Governor Schwarzenegger issued a regulatory moratorium via
executive order that imposed a 180-day freeze on rulemaking,
requesting among other things that agencies cease processing
Aug. 6, 1995, at A21 (noting that Governor Pataki’s moratorium would “continue[] at least until
the end of September”).
130. See Slackman, supra note 129 (“Gov. George Pataki is leading a quiet revolution by
moving aggressively to rearrange the state’s regulatory landscape.”); Roy Yancey, State Shapes
Rules To Weigh the Price of New Regulations, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1995, at
B2 (“Taking a page from the federal book, the Pataki administration is preparing how-to
handbooks on cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments to be distributed next month to various
state agencies.”).
131. Exec. Order No. 95-3 (R.I. Jan. 25, 1995), available at http://www.uri.edu/library/
special_collections/almond/execord/95-03.html; see also Rhode Island Governor Inauguration,
C-SPAN (Jan. 3, 1995), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/62525-1 (relaying Governor
Almond’s inaugural address on January 3, 1995); Governor Bruce Sundlun Papers 1990-1995:
Biographical Note, UNIV. OF R.I., http://www.uri.edu/library/special_collections/political_
papers/sundlun/historical.html (noting that Governor Sundlun succeeded the Democrat Bruce
Sundlun).
132. Exec. Order No. 95-3.
133. Id.
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proposed rules and suspend or postpone the effective date of
134
published regulations that had not yet become effective. Governor
135
Schwarzenegger, a Republican who had replaced a Democrat,
justified the moratorium by asserting that “the increased costs
associated with California’s regulatory environment ha[d] diminished
competition in the national and global marketplaces for the State’s
136
goods and services.” He also noted that “with the onerous impact of
over-regulation on the daily lives of Californians, it is time to reassess
the system of State Government that is perceived to work against
137
businesses and inhibit growth and economic prosperity.”
Several years later, in January 2009, Arizona’s newly elected
Republican governor, Janice Brewer, announced a moratorium just
138
one day after taking the office out of Democratic hands. Her
memorandum asked agencies, among other things, to refrain through
April 30, 2009, from sending proposed or final rules for publication
and to withdraw proposed rules that had been sent but had not yet
139
been published. She justified the order by highlighting the necessity
of “ensur[ing] that [her] appointees ha[d] the opportunity to review
140
any new or pending rules.” At the end of her order, however, she
also noted that independent agencies were welcome to comply
voluntarily in the interest “of sound regulatory practice and the
141
avoidance of costly, burdensome, or unnecessary rules.” Hence, her
motives seemed to hint at a desire to act against overregulation.
Through a combination of legislative acts and additional executive
orders, the moratorium in Arizona was extended through June
2012—meaning that it turned from a short-term, executive-driven
moratorium keyed to a political transition into a long-term
134. Exec. Order No. S-2-03 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/
executive-order/3381.
135. History of California’s Constitutional Officers, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/ca-roster/2010/pdf/01c-his_off.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
136. Exec. Order No. S-2-03.
137. Id.
138. See Governor Janice K. Brewer’s Accomplishments, OFFICE OF ARIZ. GOVERNOR
JANICE K. BREWER, http://www.azgovernor.gov/About/Gov_Accomplishments.asp (last visited
Apr. 11, 2012) (stating that Governor Brewer took office on January 21, 2009, and announced a
regulatory moratorium the next day); Janet Napolitano, WASH. POST, http://www.washington
post.com/politics/janet-napolitano/gIQAynPe9O_topic.html#path-to-power (last visited Apr. 11,
2012) (noting that Governor Brewer would succeed Democrat Janet Napolitano).
139. Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs.,
15 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 342, 342 (Jan. 30, 2009).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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moratorium that was expressly tied to the economy and
142
deregulation.
One year after Governor Brewer first announced the initial
moratorium in Arizona, New Jersey’s newly elected governor, Chris
143
Christie, another Republican who had replaced a Democrat,
declared that “[a]ll proposed regulations and rules” specified in an
appendix accompanying the order were to be suspended for ninety
144
days. He also directed that rules that had not yet been published in
145
the state register should be withdrawn. Like other governors, he
justified the freeze by claiming that it was necessary “to address the
current economic and fiscal situation” and “to ensure that the
regulatory processes of State Government do not have the effect of
preventing this State from attracting new business enterprises,
constraining the growth and expansion” of businesses, or “hindering
146
the creation of jobs.”
Over the course of the following year, as the economy continued
to suffer, several other newly elected governors followed New
147
Jersey’s lead, implementing rule freezes in their own states in the
name of boosting the economy and avoiding overregulation. For
example, New Mexico’s governor, Susana Martinez, a Republican
148
who had replaced a Democrat, signed an order on her first day in
office on January 1, 2011, that suspended “[a]ll proposed and pending
rules and regulations, excluding those not under the authority of the
Governor,” for a period of ninety days, with limited, specified
149
exceptions. Just days later in Maine, on January 10, 2011, right after

142. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.
143. David M. Halbfinger & Ian Urbina, G.O.P. Wins Two Key Governors’ Races;
Bloomberg Prevails in a Close Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
11/04/nyregion/04elect.html.
144. Exec. Order No. 1 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/infobank/circular/
eocc1.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See New Jersey: Common Sense Drives Regulatory Reform—A Positive Influence
Outside Our Own State, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2011, at 17 (suggesting that
“newly elected governors in Florida, Nevada, New Mexico and North Carolina have instituted
rule freezes” inspired by New Jersey’s own freeze (quoting Kim Gaudagno, Lieutenant
Governor of New Jersey)).
148. Marc Lacey, New Mexico Governor Rushes To Undo the Agenda of Her Predecessor,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A11.
149. Exec. Order No. 2011-001 para. 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.governor.
state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf.
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150

taking the governorship out of Democratic hands, the newly elected
Republican governor, Paul LePage, issued an order, that put a sixmonth halt on rulemaking in the state to enable his office to review
proposed and pending rules, allowing rules to go forward during this
151
period only if given the green light by his governor’s office. Also in
January 2011, Tennessee’s governor, Bill Haslam, a Republican who
152
had replaced a Democratic governor, issued a statement at the very
beginning of his administration announcing “a 45-day freeze on any
new regulations and rules as part of the top-to-bottom review of state
153
government.”
One other state that saw a newly elected governor impose a brief
rule freeze in 2011 was Florida. Specifically, in January 2011,
154
immediately upon coming into office,
Florida’s Republican
governor, Rick Scott, stressed the need to avoid “duplicative,
obsolete and unnecessarily burdensome requirements” on citizens

150. See Kevin Miller, Gov.-Elect LePage Takes Oath Today, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.),
Jan. 5, 2011, at 1 (noting that the Republican Governor LePage would succeed Democrat John
Baldacci on January 5, 2011).
151. Exec. Order No. 09 (Me. Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whats
new/index.php?topic=Gov_Executive_Orders&id=182022&v=article2011. Notably, Governor
LePage’s moratorium was immediately supplemented by an order issued by Maine’s secretary
of state, who chose to implement “an immediate moratorium on rulemaking within the bureaus
overseen by his office” and a review of existing and pending rules. Secretary of State Summers
Implements Rulemaking Moratorium, Will Scrutinize Pending Rules, STATES NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 11, 2011, available at Academic OneFile, Doc. No. GALE|A246202209. Maine’s secretary
of state is elected by the state’s legislature as a constitutional officer and is governed by the
“Maine Constitution rather than by the Governor and Executive Department.” Id. Hence, the
secretary of state felt that his supplemental order was necessary because the office of the
secretary of state “is authorized under Maine’s Constitution and therefore theoretically outside
of those impacted by the Governor’s Executive Order.” Id. (quoting Summers).
152. Gov. Bill Haslam (R), NAT’L J., http://www.nationaljournal.com/almanac/person/billhaslam-us (last updated July 1, 2011).
153. Press Release, Governor Bill Haslam, Haslam Announces Freeze of New Rules and
Regulations (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://news.tennesseeanytime.org/node/6611. One highprofile rule reportedly frozen by Governor Haslam’s order was a Tennessee Department of
Revenue rule change that allegedly would have impacted online retailer Amazon.com. See
Brian Reisinger, Retailers Call Play for Amazon ‘Unfair,’ NASHVILLE BUS. J., Apr. 1, 2011,
http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/print-edition/2011/04/01/retailers-call-play-for-amazonunfair.html (“The Department of Revenue canceled [a] hearing on the rule change, citing
Haslam’s regulatory freeze as he came into office.”).
154. Ryan Mills, On the Job: Rick Scott Sworn In as Florida’s 45th Governor, Issues First
Orders, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2011/
jan/04/rick-scott-sworn-in-florida-governor-inauguration.
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and businesses by suspending rulemaking in the state. His order did
not include a defined time period for the rulemaking suspension;
nevertheless, a subsequent order issued by Governor Scott suggested
that he had intended the suspension to last only temporarily while his
administration worked to get a new Office of Fiscal Accountability
and Regulatory Reform (OFARR) set up. Moving forward, OFARR
would have to approve rulemaking by agencies under the governor’s
156
direction before rules could move forward.
In short, as all of this executive activity demonstrates, numerous
state governors have experimented with freezing regulatory activity
for brief periods immediately upon coming into office, generally in
the name of helping the economy and avoiding overregulation. This
phenomenon suggests that at least some governors see soft moratoria
as a means of aligning the regulatory machinery with their own policy
goals.
b. Hard Gubernatorial Moratoria. Reliance upon executivedriven moratoria in the states has not been limited to brief periods of
political transition. To the contrary, some governors have ordered
hard moratoria spanning one or more years—similar to President
George H.W. Bush’s one-year moratorium on federal regulatory
157
158
159
activity in 1992. Although North Carolina, Arizona, and perhaps
160
Michigan all fall into this category, Nevada and Washington provide
the clearest examples and are discussed here.

155. Exec. Order No. 11-01 (Fla. Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/
uploads/orders/2011/11-01-rulemaking.pdf, superseded by Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8,
2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.
156. See Exec. Order No. 11-72 § 1 (requiring state agencies “to submit all proposed notices,
along with the complete text of the proposed rule or amendment, to OFARR” and prohibiting
agencies from publishing “any required notice without prior OFARR’s approval”). The Florida
Supreme Court, however, later refused to read Executive Order No. 11-72 as overriding the
suspension of rulemaking in the state. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804, at
*10 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per curiam) (“We trust that any provision in Executive Order 11-72
suspending agency compliance with the [Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
120 (West 2008)], i.e., rulemaking, will not be enforced against an agency at this time . . . .”).
157. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.
160. See Exec. Order No. 1995-6 § 4 (Mich. Mar. 31, 1995), available at http://www.state.mi.
us/migov/gov/ExecutiveOrders/1995/1995-6.html (ordering that agencies “shall process rules
only when the rules are required by law, are necessary to interpret or enforce the law, are
necessary to rescind or amend obsolete or superseded rules, or are necessary due to compelling
public need”).
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i. Washington. In November 2010, Washington’s governor,
Christine Gregoire, a Democrat who had assumed the governorship
161
ordered the suspension of all “non-critical rule
in 2005,
162
development” by state agencies through January 1, 2012. In issuing
the suspension, Governor Gregoire cited the need for a “stable and
predictable regulatory and policy environment” in a time of “severe
budget constraints” and the difficulty small businesses and
governments face when “monitor[ing] and respond[ing] to proposed
163
changes in rules and policies.” To try to help clear up ambiguity
around which rules would be deemed critical and hence exempted
from the suspension, Governor Gregoire’s office promptly issued a
clarifying memorandum, stating that the “Governor is directing
164
agencies to suspend rule making that is not immediately necessary.”
The memo also set forth certain categories of rules that would be
deemed critical, such as rules required by federal or state law and
rules “necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare or
necessary to avoid an immediate threat to the state’s natural
165
resources.”
Then, in the fall of 2011, Governor Gregoire issued another
order, extending the initial moratorium through December 31,
166
2012 —meaning that the moratorium was now scheduled to last
more than two years. In extending the moratorium, Governor
Gregoire explained that “[i]t’s clear from the state of our economy
that the timing isn’t right to end the moratorium,” and that “[g]iving
small businesses and local governments more time to devote their full
attention to creating jobs and helping communities will help support
167
the economy.” Hence, Washington’s moratorium is notable not only
because it—unlike many other state-level moratoria—was issued by a

161. Chris McGann, Gregoire Sworn In amid Legal Challenge, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1.
162. Exec. Order No. 10-06 § 1 (Wash. Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.governor.wa
.gov/execorders/eo_10-06.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Memorandum from Kari Burrell, Exec. Policy Dir., to Agency Dirs. (Nov. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/20101116_memo_eo_10-06.pdf (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Exec. Order No. 11-03, at 1 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa
.gov/execorders/eo_11-03.pdf.
167. Press Release, Governor Chris Gregoire, Gov. Gregoire Extends Rule Moratorium
(Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressRelease=
1784&newsType=1.
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Democratic governor, but also because it was slated to last more than
two years.
ii. Nevada. Turning to Nevada, Governor Brian Sandoval, a
Republican who had taken over the governorship from a fellow
168
Republican, issued a one-year freeze on proposed regulations, with
specified exceptions, immediately upon coming into office in January
169
2011. Although his order spoke of the need to review regulations to
170
ensure that they were consistent with his regulatory policy, the oneyear freeze went well beyond a brief period of political change. The
freeze was, for example, twice as long as the one ordered by
171
Governor Schwarzenegger in California in 2003 and four times as
172
long as the freeze ordered by New Mexico’s governor in 2011.
Hence, Governor Sandoval’s freeze seems to be most properly
classified not as a soft moratorium tied to a brief period of political
transition but rather as a hard moratorium tied to relieving businesses
of regulatory burdens, much like the moratorium President George
173
H.W. Bush issued in 1992. Indeed, statements made by Governor
Sandoval and his aides seemed to confirm that the moratorium was
not simply about the political transition but rather was about the
174
economy.
2. Calls for Hard Moratoria by State Legislatures. In addition to
the various moratoria imposed by state governors, state-level
moratoria also have come about as a result of legislative action in at
175
least two states: Arizona and North Carolina. Additionally, state

168. Ed Vogel, Sandoval Set To Take Office, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 1, 2011, at 2B.
169. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 para. 1 (Nev. Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://ndep.nv.gov/
docs_10/exec-order-2011-01.pdf.
170. See id. para. 2 (“The review shall include an assessment of how each regulation or set of
regulations is consistent with my regulatory priorities—that is, to protect the health and welfare
of the people of the state of Nevada without discouraging economic growth.”).
171. See Exec. Order No. S-2-03 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/
executive-order/3381 (ordering a 180-day regulatory freeze).
172. See Exec. Order No. 2011-001 para. 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf
(ordering a ninety-day regulatory freeze).
173. See supra notes 41–66 and accompanying text.
174. See Ed Vogel, New Rules Don’t Violate Sandoval Order, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 12,
2011, at 3B (“Sandoval made it clear the regulation freeze was meant strictly for regulations
affecting business and that he wanted to help, not hurt, businesses.”).
175. Idaho stands in a different but somewhat related category. The Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5201 to -5292 (2006), requires legislative review of all
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legislators in other states have proposed bills and nonbinding
resolutions calling for moratoria. This Section describes this
legislative activity.
a. State Laws Imposing Moratoria. The legislatures in both
Arizona and North Carolina have experimented with imposing
different kinds of regulatory moratoria. These legislatures, however,
have not acted alone. Rather, they have acted in concert with the
governors in those states.
i. Arizona. In Arizona, the state’s moratorium began when
Governor Brewer came into office and ordered a regulatory
moratorium on January 22, 2009, that initially was to last only
176
through April 2009. She subsequently extended the moratorium,
177
first through June 29, 2009, and then later through November 24,
178
2009. In the midst of her actions, however, the legislature got
involved, ultimately passing a law that extended the moratorium, first
179
180
through June 2010, and then later through June 2011. In reporting
proposed rules by a joint subcommittee, id. § 67-5223; see also OFFICE OF THE ADMIN. RULES
COORDINATOR, THE IDAHO RULE WRITER’S MANUAL 13 (2010), available at http://admin
rules.idaho.gov/rulemaking_templates/rule_draftmanual.pdf. Analysts at the state’s Legislative
Services Office, “who review and prepare an analysis of the proposed rules for the germane
joint subcommittees, stop reviewing proposed rules and begin drafting legislation for the
upcoming session” before the beginning of the legislative session. Id. Hence, “[p]rior to the
beginning of the legislative session a m[o]ratorium is imposed on state agencies that restricts
them from promulgating proposed rules.” Id.
176. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
177. Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs.
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/NR_043009_RegReviewDirective
.pdf; see also Jeremy Duda, Gov. Brewer Extends Suspension of Agency Rulemaking, ARIZ.
CAP. TIMES, May 1, 2009, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/05/01/brewer-extends-suspension
-of-agency-rulemaking (“[Brewer] ordered a two-month extension of the ban on April 30. The
new order keeps the suspension in effect until June 30. . . .”).
178. See Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting
Dirs. (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Register/SDOC4287
Continuation02.pdf (extending the moratorium through October 16, 2009); Memorandum from
Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs. (Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.id.state.az.us/publications/Gov_Regulatory_Review_Plan_Oct_16_2009.pdf
(extending the moratorium through November 24, 2009).
179. See Act of Sept. 4, 2009, ch. 7, § 28(A), 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1874, 1905 (imposing a
regulatory moratorium through the 2009–2010 fiscal year); ARIZONA OPENBOOKS, http://open
books.az.gov/app/transparency/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (“The State of Arizona
government operates on a fiscal year that begins on July 1 and ends on the following June 30.”).
180. Act of May 10, 2010, ch. 287, sec. 18, § 28(A), 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1804, 1829–30. A
gap in coverage existed between the two bills, with the original legislative moratorium set to
expire at the end of June 2010, and the second legislative moratorium not set to kick in until
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on the legislature’s embrace of the moratorium, one newspaper in
Arizona somewhat wryly noted, “Legislatures have enacted state
holidays. They’ve done tax holidays. Now, Arizona’s Legislature
181
wants a regulatory holiday—an extended holiday.”
Although the legislatively imposed moratorium was set to expire
182
at the end of June 2011, Governor Brewer stepped back in on June
30, 2011, with yet another order to executive state agencies—this time
183
calling for the moratorium to continue through June 30, 2012. In
extending the moratorium once again, Governor Brewer noted that
“the economic climate in Arizona continues to challenge both those
seeking employment and our employers,” that “a predictable
regulatory climate in this State will promote job creation and
retention,” and that “the expiration of the current regulatory review
and moratorium could result in a regulatory explosion detrimental to
184
job creation and retention in this State.” Notably, she also pointed
to the actions of other states as support for the moratorium, reporting
that from the time she had called for the moratorium in 2009, “other
states ha[d] since implemented regulatory reviews and
185
moratoriums.”
ii. North Carolina. North Carolina has also experienced an
interesting mix of legislative and executive action regarding
regulatory moratoria. In October 2010, North Carolina’s governor,
186
Beverly Perdue, a Democrat who had taken office in 2009, issued an
executive order commanding her cabinet secretaries to refrain from
creating any new rules until the order was rescinded unless the rules
were “deemed necessary to serve the public interest” or were
187
required by law. Although the command might have been read to

July 29, 2010. Exec. Order No. 2010-13 (Ariz. June 30, 2010), available at http://azgovernor.gov/
dms/upload/EO_2010-13.pdf. Hence, Governor Brewer filled the gap, issuing an executive order
that extended the moratorium from July 1, 2010, through July 29, 2010. Id.
181. Mary Jo Pitzl, Freeze on New Laws, Rules Sought, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2009, at 1.
182. Act of May 10, 2010, sec. 18, § 28(A), 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 1829–30.
183. Exec. Order No. 2011-05 (Ariz. June 30, 2011), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/diro/
admin_rules/documents/Governor-Executive-Order_2011-05.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Press Release, Office of Governor Bev Perdue, Perdue Inaugurated as 73rd Governor,
Pledges Strong, Hands-on Leadership in Tough Times (Jan. 10, 2009), available at http://www.
governor.state.nc.us/newsItems/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?newsItemID=13.
187. Exec. Order No. 2011-001 § 2(1)(a) (N.C. Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.
governor.state.nc.us/NewsItems/UploadedFiles/88069e35-fa4c-4d03-b785-6455d7dc8880.pdf.
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lack teeth, given that the word “necessary” could be read liberally to
188
allow most if not all otherwise-authorized rules to proceed,
Governor Perdue simultaneously issued a press release that
demonstrated that she meant the word “necessary” to be read
189
stringently. The press release began by noting, “Governor Perdue
today issued a directive to her cabinet secretaries and a request of
Council of State members: do not create any new rules unless they
190
are absolutely necessary.”
After Governor Perdue had issued her ban on noncritical rules,
the state legislature became involved, passing a law in March 2011
that barred agencies from adopting rules that would result in
“substantial estimated additional costs”—defined as an aggregate
financial impact on all persons subject to the rule of at least $500,000
in a twelve-month period—unless adoption of the rule fell within a
specified exception, such as being necessary to respond to “a serious
and unforeseen threat to the public health, safety, or welfare,” or to a
191
law or court order. The law was reportedly designed to “prohibit
new regulations that would hit North Carolinians in the
192
pocketbook,” or as one newspaper put it, to freeze “new rules if

188. For example, at the federal level, Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp.
IV 2010), which was initially adopted by President Clinton, seems to ban regulations that are
not necessary, providing,
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are
necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such
as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of
the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people.
Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (emphasis
added). This text, however, appears in a section of the executive order titled “Statement of
Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” id., and it could be read to set more of an aspirational
regulatory philosophy for agencies than a stringent requirement. Indeed, President Clinton
surely did not view this language as imposing the equivalent of a moratorium, given that he
openly opposed the concept of a regulatory moratorium. See Clinton, supra note 93, at 416
(asserting in 1995 that “the blunt instrument of a moratorium” was not “the right way to reform
regulation”).
189. Press Release, Office of Governor Bev Perdue, Governor Stops New Rulemaking
Unless Absolutely Necessary (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.governor.nc.gov/News
Items/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?newsItemID=1524.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, Sess. L. No. 2011-13, 2011 N.C. ALS 13 (LEXIS).
192. David N. Bass, GOP Clashes with Perdue over Regulatory Reform Agenda, CAROLINA
J. ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=
7378.

WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1918

4/12/2012 1:22 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1883
193

they [would] cost the regulated target money.” The lifespan of this
rulemaking freeze on significant rules proved fleeting, however,
because in July 2011, the legislature enacted—over Governor
194
Perdue’s veto—a new law that repealed the prior law. The new law
included a host of wide-ranging provisions relating to regulatory
reform, including a provision that barred state agencies from adopting
195
rules unless they were are “necessary to serve the public interest.”
196
This new requirement did not go into effect until October 2011, so it
is still too soon to know whether the term “necessary” will be read
loosely or stringently in North Carolina.
b. State Bills and Resolutions Proposing Moratoria. In 2011
197
alone, bills or resolutions involving proposed moratoria were
198
199
200
introduced in states such as Connecticut, Michigan, Oregon,
201
202
Washington, and West Virginia. Some of these unenacted bills
proposed a freeze on regulatory activity within the state, whereas
others were merely nonbinding resolutions encouraging the federal
government to impose a moratorium on federal rulemaking.

193. Lynn Bonner & Rob Christensen, Senators Call for Freeze of Rule Making, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 9, 2011, at B3.
194. Act of July 25, 2011, Sess. Law No. 2011-398, § 61.2, 2011 N.C. ALS 398 (LEXIS).
195. Id. § 2.
196. Id.
197. Although 2011 seems to have been a particularly busy year for moratoria proposals,
state legislatures have considered such proposals in prior years as well. For example, in 1993,
New York’s senate passed a bill called the Regulatory Relief Act of 1993, S. 3659, 190th Leg.,
216th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993), which would have established a 120-day moratorium on the
issuance of proposed or final rules with specified exceptions, id.; see also JAMES W. WRIGHT,
1993 REPORT OF THE SENATE CHAIRMAN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REVIEW
COMMISSION 23–24 (1993) (noting that S. 3659, the Regulatory Relief Act of 1993, passed the
senate in New York).
198. See S. 390, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2011) (proposing “[t]o establish a two-year
moratorium on new state regulations”).
199. See S. Res. 27, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (urging the president “to impose a
moratorium on any new regulations”).
200. See S.B. 812, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2011) (proposing a rule
moratorium); S.B. 712, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2011) (same).
201. See H.R. 1156, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2011) (proposing to suspend agency
rulemaking until the “later of July 1, 2014, or such time as the economic and revenue forecast
council reports for three consecutive quarters that state revenue collections have increased
above the official forecast”).
202. Quality Control Procedure for Agency Rules Act, S.B. 517, 80th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2011) (proposing a “five-year moratorium on the adoption of new agency rules and
modification of existing rules” but excepting “new emergency rules or modifications or new
rules or modifications required by federal or state law”).

WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

REGULATORY MORATORIA

4/12/2012 1:22 AM

1919

For example, in Michigan, the state senate passed a resolution in
March 2011 that, among other things, urged “the President of the
United States to impose a moratorium on any new [federal]
203
The
resolution
specifically
found
that
regulations.”
“[n]onproductive and burdensome regulations take a major toll on
the job-creating capacity of companies of all sizes and types” and that
“[t]he total cost of complying with all federal regulations has been
estimated to be as high as more than $1 trillion, which amounts to
204
$10,500 each year for every person employed by a small business.”
In contrast, Republican senators in Oregon introduced bills that
were aimed at freezing state regulatory activity, claiming that a
regulatory suspension was needed to “spur job creation across the
205
state” and to reduce burdens facing businesses. The Oregon leaders
pointed to Arizona and Washington, noting, “In December,
Washington Governor Chris Gregoire (D) issued an executive order
suspending the development of all new agency rules,” and “Arizona
206
Governor Jan Brewer (R) enacted a similar order in 2009.”
Evidently, news of state-level regulatory moratoria travels among
207
various governmental actors, likely helping to fuel regulatory
moratoria’s emergence at the state level.
II. ASSESSING THE PROPRIETY AND LEGALITY OF MORATORIA
Both hard and soft moratoria have worked their way into the
political toolbox at the federal and state levels thanks to legislative
and executive action. The emergence of regulatory moratoria,
however, invites the question whether moratoria are sound from both
a legal and policy perspective.
This Part seeks to identify and assess the major legal and policy
arguments in favor of and against soft and hard regulatory moratoria.

203. S. Res. 27, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011).
204. Id.
205. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, Republicans Call for Moratorium on Agency
Rulemaking (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/press_releases/sro_012011
.pdf; see also Michelle Cole, GOP Seeks Two-Year Halt to New State Agency Rules,
OREGONIAN, Jan. 21, 2011, available at NewsBank, Doc No. MERLIN_16457724 (describing
Oregon Republicans’ demand for a regulatory moratorium).
206. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, supra note 205.
207. See Johanna Maurice, The Future Belongs to the Nimble, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.
Va.), July 9, 2011, at 5A (noting “[w]eird things” happening in other states, such as how “[i]n
Florida, Nevada, New Mexico and Tennessee, new Republican governors [had] issued executive
orders putting freezes on new state regulations”).
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This Part concludes that hard moratoria carry minimal benefits and
significant costs. As a result, it warns against the use of hard
moratoria—such as those implemented by President George H.W.
Bush in 1992 and those implemented at the state level in Arizona,
Nevada, and Washington. Nevertheless, this Part also concludes that
soft moratoria—such as those used by Presidents Reagan, Clinton,
George W. Bush, and Obama upon coming into office—might well
play an appropriate role when used carefully by the executive branch
following a change in administration so as to further democratic
accountability.
A. Hard Moratoria: An Improper and Ill-Advised Tool
Hard moratoria are often justified on the grounds that they will
reduce costs and regulatory burdens, increase regulatory
predictability,
and
address
Americans’
concerns
about
overregulation. At the same time, however, hard moratoria raise
numerous risks, including a lack of transparency, protracted
regulatory confusion, legal challenges, harm to the public interest,
and blunt antiregulatory bias. Hence, balancing the costs and benefits
of regulatory moratoria reveals that the willingness of states such as
Arizona, Nevada, and Washington to impose hard moratoria should
not be replicated elsewhere.
1. The Asserted Benefits of Hard Regulatory Moratoria.
Proponents of hard moratoria either implicitly or explicitly articulate
three major arguments in favor of hard moratoria: (1) the avoidance
of costly, burdensome, or unnecessary regulations to achieve cost
savings; (2) the creation of a stable and consistent regulatory
environment; and (3) political symbolism.
a. Achieving Cost Savings. The most pervasive argument made
in favor of hard moratoria—whether imposed by the executive or by
the legislative branch—has to do with the desire to achieve cost
savings during tough economic times by avoiding costly, burdensome,
or unnecessary regulations. For example, in announcing Washington’s
moratorium in 2010, Governor Gregoire noted the need to “conserve
208
resources” in the face of a weak economy.

208. See Exec. Order No. 10-06, at 1 (Wash. Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.
governor.wa.gov/execorders/eo_10-06.pdf (“[W]e are called upon in these unprecedented
economic times to both conserve resources and continue to meet our responsibilities . . . .”).
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The implication of these sorts of statements seems to be that by
freezing rules, moratoria will reduce costs, conserve resources, and
avoid unnecessary and burdensome regulation. Nevertheless, the
reality is that—due in no small part to the general lack of scholarly
attention paid to regulatory moratoria—very little is known about
whether these assertions about cost savings are true. In 1992, for
example, President George H.W. Bush claimed that the reforms that
he had set into motion during the first three months of his
administration would “save consumers about $15 billion to $20 billion
a year”—a savings of “$225 to $300 per year for the average
209
American family.” Yet his administration refused—despite public210
records requests—to provide data to back up these claims, and one
scholar—Professor Scott Furlong—has concluded that the Bush
211
“moratorium had a minimal impact on regulatory output,” thus
undermining President Bush’s claims.
Moreover, even if one could prove—contrary to Professor
Furlong’s findings—that moratoria do lead to lower regulatory
output, this showing would say “nothing about the actual impact of
212
not promulgating certain regulations.” For example, Governor
Gregoire claimed that agencies in Washington had “put 436 rules—
about half of what was proposed—on hold” in the first year of the
213
state’s moratorium. But merely considering the number of rules put
on hold in Washington does not give a full picture of the impact of
not promulgating the regulations. This is because regulations are
developed to try to bring benefits to society, including “cleaner air
214
and water, safer products, a sounder banking system.” Therefore,
when regulations are not promulgated, any benefit to those who seek
to avoid regulation may well be offset by harm to society at large,
such as harm to the environment or to public health. The benefits that
flow from rules may be quite significant and hence should form part
of the calculus when one considers the cost savings of moratoria.
Indeed, especially at the federal level, that the benefits of most rules
outweigh the costs seems quite likely, given the centralized review

209. Bush, supra note 51, at 664.
210. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii–iii (“The administration refused [public
records requests] on grounds of ‘executive privilege.’”).
211. Furlong, supra note 14, at 260–61.
212. Id. at 257.
213. Press Release, Governor Chris Gregoire, supra note 167.
214. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at 23.
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process run by OIRA and the fairly robust opportunities for judicial
review of rules.
Although one’s initial instinct might be to think that fewer rules
mean lower enactment and enforcement costs to the government, as
well as lower compliance costs to those regulated, the evidence about
potential costs savings is not well developed. Until more evidence is
collected, unproven claims that moratoria will yield cost savings and
conserve resources seem an insufficient basis for imposing something
as blunt as a freeze on rulemaking—especially when numerous other
tools already exist to ensure sound and responsible rulemaking, such
as cost-benefit analysis, public participation in the rulemaking
process, legislative control of statutory delegations to agencies, and
215
judicial review.
b. Creating a Stable Regulatory Environment. Another major
argument commonly made in favor of hard moratoria is the
desirability of creating regulatory stability. For example, in ordering
Nevada’s moratorium, Governor Sandoval asserted that “stable,
consistent and predictable common sense regulation is vital to
maintaining a regulatory environment that both secures the people
and businesses of the state of Nevada and fosters economic
216
growth.” Similarly, in arguing in favor of a federal moratorium,
Senator Susan Collins of Maine analogized to sports time-outs, noting
that time-outs are taken to “give athletes a chance to catch their
217
breaths and make better decisions about the next play.” According
to Senator Collins, “American workers and businesses are the
athletes in a global competition,” and “[t]hey need a time-out from
218
excessive regulation so that America can get back to work.”
These sorts of repeated claims that regulatory moratoria will lead
to greater regulatory certainty and will give businesses a “time-out,”
however, seem oversimplified. For one thing, as Professor Jonathan
Adler points out in responding to Senator Collins’s claims, “Kicking
the regulatory can down the road does not reduce uncertainty, nor
219
does it improve the investment climate.” Rather, pushing regulation
215. Cf. supra note 1.
216. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, at 1 (Nev. Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://ndep.nv.gov/docs_
10/exec-order-2011-01.pdf.
217. Susan Collins, Opinion, The Economy Needs a Regulation Time-Out, WALL ST. J., Sept.
26, 2011, at A15.
218. Id.
219. Adler, supra note 15.
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down the line is likely to create more uncertainty about the future
220
and to place a strain on industry planning cycles.
Furthermore, a long-term moratorium freezing agencies out of
notice-and-comment rulemaking might prod agencies to try to clear
up regulatory uncertainty via other less desirable means. For
example, agencies might promulgate policy via case-by-case
221
adjudication if the agency has adjudicatory authority. Or if the
moratorium could be read to apply only to notice-and-comment
222
rules, then the agency might turn toward issuing more informal
guidance documents, general policy statements, and interpretive
223
rules,
which are generally exempt from notice-and-comment
224
requirements. These alternative methods of promulgating policy
generally lack the same opportunities for political review,
transparency, and public participation as those that are built into the
225
normal notice-and-comment rulemaking process,
and this

220. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii (arguing that a “rule freeze, in fact, can
harm the economy since businesses face uncertainty about what standards they must comply
with” and since “delaying implementation of regulations” can “place[] a strain on the capital
planning cycles of industry”); cf. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, STATE OF WASH., RULEMAKING
SUSPENSION UPDATE 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/docs/decision_
list.pdf (noting that a rulemaking involving outdoor burning could be delayed until 2012 under
Washington’s rulemaking suspension but acknowledging that waiting until 2012 would “delay
improvements in rule clarity and streamlining that benefit those businesses and residents who
may be subject to the regulations”).
221. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
222. See, e.g., Two-Year Regulatory Freeze Act of 2011, S. 1531, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing a two-year regulatory freeze but exempting from the freeze all regulations that are
exempted from the notice requirements of section 4(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006)).
223. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 220, at 1, 2 (noting that the Department of
Ecology would delay a rulemaking related to reclaimed water pursuant to Governor Gregoire’s
rulemaking suspension and that “Ecology can use the delay to focus on developing guidance
about reclaimed water that answers concerns raised by stakeholders” (emphasis added)).
224. See, e.g., APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (exempting “interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice” from notice-andcomment requirements under the federal APA).
225. See Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed
Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 338 (2007) (noting that
“guidance documents, case-by-case administrative adjudication, or other informal
mechanisms . . . lack the transparency or democratic legitimacy of the rulemaking process”);
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546 (2002) (describing how “[m]aking policy through
adjudication can lead to inconsistent outcomes and frustrates expectations when policy changes
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circumvention of notice-and-comment rulemaking would hence
undermine good governance.
c. Furthering Political Symbolism. Finally, from the perspective
of politicians who support regulatory moratoria, a third benefit of
hard moratoria might have to do with popular discourse and political
symbolism. By supporting regulatory moratoria, politicians are able
to issue press releases, appear on television, and author editorials in
the name of standing up against overregulation and listening to
constituents’ concerns. Although supporters of regulatory moratoria
generally do not forthrightly state that they are proposing moratoria
to be responsive to constituents’ concerns, many of their actions and
comments suggest that those concerns are indeed at play.
Americans’ concerns in 1992 about the ailing economy and
overregulation, for example, seem to have motivated President
George H.W. Bush to issue his one-year moratorium in the midst of
226
his presidential campaign. President Bush chose to announce during
his acceptance speech before the Republican National Convention in
the summer of 1992 that he would be extending his moratorium,
leading to the perception among some that the moratorium was
227
nothing more than an “election-year gambit.” Indeed, even his aides
referred to “new polls showing public distaste” for regulation when
228
explaining President Bush’s motivations in imposing the freeze.
In addition, the spurt of bills proposed in Congress in 2011
calling for a regulatory moratorium seem linked to polls showing a
distaste for overregulation. Most notably, a poll released by Gallup in
October 2011 showed that “[s]mall business owners in the United
States are most likely to say complying with government regulations
(22%) is the most important problem facing them today, followed by
consumer confidence in the economy (15%) and lack of consumer

retroactively”); cf. APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting these alternative policy
instruments from the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
226. See Furlong, supra note 14, at 261 (“Symbolically, the moratorium showed a president
responding to an economic crisis as well as catering to conservative voters.”).
227. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at i.
228. Jehl, supra note 46; see also Corporate Executives Surveyed Say Government
Regulations Top Concern, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 207, 208 (1992) (reporting that in a survey of
653 corporate executives during the second half of 1991, government regulation was identified
as the top concern for more than 50 percent of all chief executive officers).
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229

demand (12%).” In addition, whereas Gallup polls indicated that
only 36 percent of Americans in 2006 and 38 percent in 2007 and 2008
had said that there was “too much” government regulation of
business and industry, the percentage spiked to 50 percent of
Americans by September 2011—a result that was “by one percentage
point the highest in Gallup’s [then-nineteen-year] history” of asking
230
the question. Notably, 84 percent of Republicans—compared to
only 22 percent of Democrats—polled in September 2011 answered
this question by saying that there was “too much government
regulation of business and industry” whereas just 56 percent of
Republicans—compared with 23 percent of Democrats—polled in
2008 had answered the question by saying that there was “too much”
231
government regulation.
Various Republican members of Congress appear to have paid
careful attention to these polls. For instance, in introducing the
232
Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, one Republican member of the
House justified the need for a regulatory moratorium by noting that
“[s]mall businesses tell us that their top challenge is complying with
233
government regulations.” Similarly, when Senator Susan Collins
234
introduced the same act in the Senate, she signaled that she was
paying close attention to public opinion. Specifically, in a televised
interview with CNBC, she explained that she had come up with the
idea for proposing a regulatory “time-out” after “talking to
employers in [her] state [who] kept telling [her] they were dreading
235
what was coming out of Washington next by way of regulation.” She
also tried to speak directly to American workers and businesses when
229. Dennis Jacobe, Gov’t Regulations at Top of Small-Business Owners’ Problem List,
GALLUP (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150287/gov-regulations-top-small-businessowners-problem-list.aspx.
230. Frank Newport, Despite Negativity, Americans Mixed on Ideal Role of Gov’t, GALLUP
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149741/despite-negativity-americans-mixed-idealrole-gov.aspx.
231. See id. (noting that “Republicans have consistently been more likely than Democrats to
say there is too much government regulation of business” but that “in recent years, the gap
between Republican and Democratic views on this issue has widened”).
232. Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, H.R. 3257, 112th Cong. (2011).
233. Press Release, U.S. Rep. Richard Hanna, Hanna Introduces Legislation To Put a TimeOut on Regulations (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://hanna.house.gov/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=3157:hanna-introduces-legislation-to-put-a-time-out-on-regulations&
catid=49:press&Itemid=300066.
234. Regulatory Time-Out Act of 2011, S. 1538, 112th Cong. (2011).
235. The Kudlow Report (CNBC television program Sept. 26, 2011), available at http://
video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000047845.
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she published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal arguing in favor of a
moratorium in which she asserted, “I have asked employers in my
state what it would take to help them add jobs. No matter their
business or the size of their work force, they tell me that Washington
236
must stop imposing crushing new regulations.”
In addition, when Republicans in the Oregon State Senate called
for a two-year suspension of rulemaking in 2011 to spur job creation
across the state, they pointed out that “[s]mall businesses routinely
point to the bureaucratic morass of state government rules and
237
regulations as a key barrier to job creation.”
Likewise, in
Washington, the Department of Ecology’s deputy director noted that
Governor Gregoire’s decision to suspend noncritical rulemaking “is
responsive to what she is hearing from the broader regulated
community,” which is “telling her they are struggling in this difficult
economic climate to meet current regulations—not only
environmental regulations, but others as well—and that a time-out on
238
new rules is something government can do to help.”
Hence, from the perspective of politicians, a major advantage of
a regulatory moratorium does seem to be its political symbolism,
enabling politicians to show Americans that their concerns about
overregulation have been registered and heard. Indeed, the number
of unenacted regulatory-moratoria bills proposed in the 112th
239
Congress suggests that politicians believe that they may well gain
this political benefit simply by touting that they have proposed a
moratorium—regardless of whether the moratorium is ever actually
implemented.
Political representation and political responsiveness is, of course,
a central component of American democracy and is generally to be
applauded. If, for example, residents who live downwind from a plant
ask for increased regulation of pollutants from the plant, the
governor’s touting such complaints as a justification for more
regulation of the plant would be perfectly appropriate. On the one
hand, the fact that politicians’ proposals for regulatory moratoria seek
to respond to constituents’ concerns about overregulation could be

236. Collins, supra note 217.
237. Press Release, Senate Republican Office, supra note 205.
238. Letter from Polly Zehm, Deputy Dir., Dep’t of Ecology, State of Wash., to Ecology
Stakeholders (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/docs/zehmletter_
111710.html.
239. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
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viewed positively as a sign of political responsiveness in a democratic
system. On the other hand, concerns about overregulation may suffer
from a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem. Specifically, whether
politicians’ own statements about the pitfalls of regulation have
created an antiregulatory fever, and hence whether the politicians are
actually the ones who have created the public opinion leaning against
regulatory action, is hard to know. In other words, politicians’ own
public statements condemning regulation may have helped to create
and feed the public climate.
2. The Costs of Hard Regulatory Moratoria. Even if hard
moratoria can be said to appropriately help ensure political
responsiveness to legitimate public opinion, this political benefit must
be weighed against the costs of moratoria. Hard moratoria carry with
them many significant potential costs. First, as demonstrated by a
240
2011 Florida Supreme Court opinion, executive-driven regulatory
moratoria raise thorny legal questions, including separation-ofpowers concerns about whether the executive possesses the legal
authority to suspend rulemaking. In addition, both legislative- and
executive-driven moratoria threaten to undermine transparency,
create protracted regulatory confusion, and evince a blunt
antiregulatory bias that simply assumes that the status quo is better
than what the current administration would produce for the future.
These aspects of hard moratoria suggest that the costs of hard
moratoria significantly outweigh any political or symbolic benefits,
leading to the conclusion that hard moratoria are an ill-advised tool
for political control and should be avoided.
a. Imposing the Costs of Legal Challenges. One of the most
significant risks of executive-driven moratoria is their likelihood to
invite legal battles. In the wake of President George H.W. Bush’s
1992 moratoria, for example, a number of cases were filed challenging
241
agencies’ delays of rules. These cases raised a variety of questions
pertaining to specific rules, such as whether certain rules were

240. See Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804, at *1 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per
curiam) (addressing the legality of the Florida governor’s decision to suspend rulemaking in the
state).
241. See WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at 18–22 (describing litigation challenging
agency delays).
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required by statutory deadlines or statutory requirements. If they
were, President Bush lacked the authority to suspend them.
Even more threatening than the potential for as-applied claims
asserting that specific rules must be exempt from a hard moratorium,
however, is the possibility that broader constitutional issues—most
notably, separation-of-powers issues—could be raised challenging the
facial validity of the chief executive’s order. At the federal level,
“[m]ost regulatory statutes specify that agency heads, rather than the
243
president, shall make regulatory decisions.” In the states, many, if
not most, regulatory statutes delegate rulemaking authority to agency
244
heads, not to state governors. Those desiring to challenge executivedriven hard moratoria might well question whether the chief
executive has the power—consistent with notions of the separation of
powers and existing statutory schemes—to suspend discretionary
rulemaking activities that the legislature chose to delegate to agency
245
heads, not to the chief executive. The answer to this question is not
straightforward, and it likely varies at the federal and state levels due
to the differing separation-of-powers principles and different
constitutional and statutory provisions at play in different
246
jurisdictions.
At least at the federal level, a robust body of literature erupted
after President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which called
247
for OMB review of all major rules. Specifically, scholars questioned
whether the president had the legal authority to direct centralized
executive review of regulatory activity in light of Congress’s general

242. Id.
243. Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over
Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2487 (2011); see also Kevin M.
Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 550–52 (2005) (discussing presidential
directive authority).
244. See, e.g., Whiley, 2011 WL 3568804, at *5 (noting that in Florida, the “Legislature has
delegated specific responsibility to agency heads, such as the authority to determine whether to
go forward with proposing, amending, repealing or adopting rules”); see also New Energy
Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 291 (N.M. 2011) (concluding that the state legislature had
delegated duties to state agencies independent of the governor).
245. A legislatively imposed hard moratorium, of course, would not raise similar separationof-powers concerns because the legislature itself would be suspending rulemaking activity that it
had created in the first instance.
246. Cf. Carl T. Bogus, The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 77, 80 (2004) (noting that the states differ as to how they approach separation-of-powers
issues and “as to what extent they seek equipoise among the branches”).
247. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 §§ 6–7, 3 C.F.R. 127, 131–33 (1982) (granting broad review
powers to a task force within OMB).
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decision to delegate rulemaking power via statute to particular
248
agencies, not to the president. At least three principal approaches to
the question of presidential directive authority have emerged as this
general debate over presidential authority to direct regulatory
decisions has continued. The first approach—the unitary-executive
approach—“holds that presidential directive authority is
249
constitutionally required.” The unitary-executive theory flows from
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests the
250
executive power in “a President of the United States.” Pursuant to
the unitary-executive theory, “executive officers can act only in the
President’s stead, since it is the President and the President alone who
can delegate to them the constitutional power that they must have if
251
they are to execute laws.” In other words, notwithstanding any
statutory language that might vest a particular power, such as
discretionary rulemaking authority, in a particular agency, “it is the
President, under our Constitution, who must always be the ultimate
252
empowered and responsible actor.”
The second approach—the “‘directive authority’ as an
‘interpretive principle’” approach—takes the position that “statutes
entrusting regulatory decisions to [executive] agency heads should be
interpreted to grant the President directive authority unless they
253
expressly restrict it.” This approach, which has been articulated by
then-Professor Kagan, rejects unitary-executive advocates’ claims
248. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in
Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988) (discussing “the
constitutional controversies surrounding Executive Order 12,291 and the promise of similar
disputes over Executive Order 12,498” but concluding that “[w]hatever one’s opinion of the
policy prescriptions contained in President Reagan’s executive orders, the actions taken therein
fall squarely within the president’s constitutional authority”); Colin S. Diver, Commentary,
Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 526–27 (1987) (“[N]umerous critics have charged
that, as actually implemented, the executive orders constitute a distortion of the President’s
supervisory role.”); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An
Analysis of Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1199 (1981) (“[T]he question . . . is whether the President in promulgating Executive order
12,291 has engaged in an exercise of Executive lawmaking without either constitutional or
statutory authority and thereby violated the separation of powers doctrine.”); Peter M. Shane,
Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1235 (1981) (exploring “the [fundamental]
threshold question of the order’s facial legality”).
249. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488 (summarizing the unitary-executive theory).
250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
251. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 20, at 595.
252. Id. at 595–96.
253. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488.
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“for plenary [executive] control as a matter of constitutional
254
mandate.” Instead, then-Professor Kagan views the question as one
of congressional intent, arguing that “if Congress, as it usually does,
simply has assigned discretionary authority to an agency official
without in any way commenting on the President’s role in the
delegation,” then a way to read such a statute—at least when
executive as opposed to independent agencies are involved—would
be to “assume that the delegation runs to the agency official specified,
rather than to any other agency official, but still subject to the
255
ultimate control of the President.”
Under the third approach, “the President does not have directive
256
authority unless a statute expressly gives it to him.” According to
this approach, “as a matter of statutory construction the President has
directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under the statute
or to bind the discretion of lower level officials—only when the
257
statute expressly grants power to the President in name.”
Although the extensive scholarly debate has yielded little
consensus as to which of these approaches to presidential powers is
correct, the reality is that centralized executive review and oversight
of the regulatory process of the type initiated by President Reagan in
258
Executive Order 12,291
has become an “entrenched” and
259
established element of the administrative process. Yet an acrossthe-board, long-term freeze on rulemaking ordered by a president
differs significantly from what is now viewed as entrenched
centralized presidential oversight, and hence—depending on which
approach to presidential power were to be applied—such a blanket
freeze could be seen as pushing the envelope too far and as violating
separation-of-powers principles.
On the one hand, for those who adhere to the unitary-executive
theory, the executive would possess ample authority to freeze
discretionary rulemaking because the president alone has the power
260
to execute federal law. In contrast, those who argue that the
president can oversee regulatory activity but cannot generally dictate
254. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2326.
255. Id. at 2326–27.
256. Percival, supra note 243, at 2488.
257. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 263, 267 (2006).
258. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
259. Beermann, supra note 1, at 65 n.20.
260. Cf. supra notes 249–52.
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or decide substantive questions delegated to agencies by Congress
might argue that a long-term rulemaking ban ordered by the
president impermissibly decides the substance of regulatory questions
261
delegated to agencies by favoring the status quo.
A case decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 2011 suggests
that the risk of an executive-driven hard moratorium’s triggering such
constitutional questions in certain jurisdictions is very real. The case,
262
Whiley v. Scott, involved a challenge to two executive orders issued
263
by Florida’s newly elected governor, Rick Scott, in 2011, and hence
the case turned on specific aspects of Florida law. The first order
264
challenged was Executive Order No. 11-01, which had suspended
agency rulemaking in the state and also had established OFARR
265
within the governor’s office. The second order challenged was
266
Executive Order No. 11-72, which had superseded Executive Order
No. 11-01 and had allowed agencies to move forward with rulemaking
267
in the state only after seeking the approval of OFARR. The woman
challenging the orders, Rosalie Whiley, was a blind woman who
claimed standing as a Florida citizen and taxpayer and initially
asserted that Executive Order 11-01 negatively impacted her as a
blind food-stamp recipient by delaying a rule that would have made
268
completing an online application for benefits easier.
In bringing suit, Whiley sought a writ of quo warranto from the
court, arguing that the governor had exceeded his authority and
269
violated separation-of-powers principles. In agreeing to exercise its
discretion to hear the case, the Florida Supreme Court noted that a
decision from it could “provide important guiding principles to other

261. Cf. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The NotSo-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 966 (2001) (“[A]lthough the president’s ability to
remove agency heads gives him enormous power to influence their decisions, it does not give
him the authority to dictate substantive decisions entrusted to them by law.”); Strauss, supra
note 20, at 704–05 (arguing that the president can act as “overseer” but not “decider”).
262. Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592, 2011 WL 3568804 (Fla. Aug. 16, 2011) (per curiam).
263. Id. at *1.
264. Exec. Order No. 11-01 (Fla. Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/
orders/2011/11-01-rulemaking.pdf, superseded by Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.
265. Id. §§ 1, 3.
266. Exec. Order No. 11-72 (Fla. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2011/11-72-fiscal.pdf.
267. Id. § 1.
268. Whiley, 2011 WL 3568804, at *2 n.4.
269. Id. at *2.
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state courts.” Then, turning to the merits, the court, over the dissent
of two justices, sided with Whiley, concluding, “[T]he Governor’s
executive orders at issue here, to the extent each suspends and
terminates rulemaking . . . absent prior approval from OFARR—
contrary to the [Florida] Administrative Procedure Act—infringe
upon the very process of rulemaking and encroach upon the
271
Legislature’s delegation of its rulemaking power.”
The court noted that in Florida, rulemaking is seen as a
legislative function and that the “Legislature retains the sole right to
272
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies.” The Florida Supreme
Court, accordingly, found that the governor’s orders “that operate[d]
to suspend rulemaking . . . constitute[d] an encroachment upon a
273
legislative function.”
Because the Whiley case turned on specific aspects of the Florida
constitution and Florida statutory provisions, its direct application is
limited to Florida. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court’s separationof-powers analysis, which rested on the conclusion that rulemaking is
274
itself a legislative function in Florida, would be relatively foreign to
federal separation-of-powers jurisprudence, which continues to
embrace the notion—albeit perhaps a fiction—that rulemaking
275
performed by agencies is executive rather than legislative in nature.
Nonetheless, Whiley does illustrate the very real threat of legal
challenges to executive-driven suspensions of rulemaking. In doing
so, it suggests the need for caution surrounding executive-driven hard
moratoria and for more study surrounding whether U.S. presidents or
state governors possess the legal authority to direct agencies to
suspend rulemaking pursuant to applicable federal or state law.

270. Id. at *3.
271. Id. at *8 (emphasis omitted).
272. Id. at *10.
273. Id.
274. See id. at *5 (“[R]ulemaking is a legislative function.”); id. at *10 (“The Legislature
retains the sole right to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies, and all provisions in
both Executive Order 11-01 or 11-72 that operate to suspend rulemaking contrary to the APA
constitute an encroachment upon a legislative function.”).
275. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (noting that the
Constitution permits no delegation of Congress’s legislative powers). But see id. at 489 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the text of Article I’s Vesting
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, “do[es] not purport to limit the authority of [Congress] to
delegate authority to others”).
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b. Undermining Transparency.
Another cost of hard
moratoria—regardless of whether the moratoria are ordered by the
executive branch or by the legislature—is that they may undermine
transparency because they are implemented largely behind closed
doors. For example, even though President George H.W. Bush’s 1992
moratorium directed agencies to “submit a written report” to the
president indicating the “regulatory changes recommended or
276
made,” these reports were not easily accessible to the public.
Indeed, the Bush White House—reportedly claiming “executive
277
privilege”—refused a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
made by OMB Watch and Public Citizen seeking data to support
President Bush’s claim of billions in cost savings stemming from the
278
moratorium. Public Citizen and OMB Watch then followed up with
additional FOIA requests to twenty-four different agencies, asking
for background data on President Bush’s claim of savings as well as
copies of the reports that agencies were required to file with the
279
president after the first ninety days of the moratorium. According to
OMB Watch and Public Citizen, most agencies responded, but their
280
reports did not describe affected regulations with much detail :
“None of the agencies provided information about ‘cost savings’ in a
form even remotely understandable. Often agencies decided such
documents constituted ‘predecisional’ material [exempted under
FOIA] and blocked out large portions of it; in other cases, sheets of
281
paper with hand-scrawled calculations were provided.”
Although these concerns about a lack of transparency are
troubling, they—unlike other costs accompanying hard moratoria—
could be overcome fairly easily. In particular, Washington state’s
implementation of its rulemaking suspension provides a model of
sorts. There, the Office of Financial Management directed agencies to
report “the number of rules eliminated or suspended in response to
[Governor Gregoire’s] order as well as the number of and
justification for rules that proceeded through development and/or

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Bush, supra note 41, at 168.
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at ii–iii.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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282

adoption,” and various state agencies responded by making their
283
reports easily accessible to the public online.
c. Creating Protracted Regulatory Confusion. A much more
troubling risk of both legislative- and executive-driven hard moratoria
is that such moratoria may lead to protracted confusion about their
scope. For example, how should North Carolina’s legislative ban on
284
rules that are not “necessary to serve the public interest” be read?
Or how should people read Washington state’s decision to exempt
rules that are “necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare
or necessary to avoid an immediate threat to the state’s natural
285
resources” from its rulemaking suspension? As one court has
recognized in another context, “‘necessary’ is a chameleon-like word
286
whose meaning . . . may be influenced by its context.” If the term
“necessary” is interpreted leniently, then few—if any—new rules
might be barred, given that all authorized rules might in some way or
another be viewed as necessary to the public interest. Alternatively, if
“necessary” is interpreted stringently, then it might be read to forbid
all rules that lack a sense of immediate emergency and hence could
operate as a very broad ban. Because of this ambiguity, state agencies
in Washington reportedly had “difficulty . . . identifying which rules
would be put on hold” immediately after Governor Gregoire ordered
287
the moratorium in Washington in 2010.
These sorts of interpretive questions are a major reason why
Sally Katzen—testifying on behalf of the Clinton administration in
1995—opposed Congress’s attempt to impose a federal regulatory

282. Memorandum from Kari Burrell, Exec. Policy Dir., to Agency Dirs., supra note 164, at
2.
283. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 220 (listing the rulemakings that have been
delayed and those that will continue); Department of Health and State Board of Health Rule
Making Activities, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/Rules/pdf/
EO1103_Moratorium_rulemaking_masterlist.pdf (last updated Oct. 14, 2011) (same);
Temporary Rule-Making Suspension, DEP’T OF REVENUE, WASH. STATE (Jan. 5, 2011), http://
dor.wa.gov/Content/FindALawOrRule/RuleMaking/tempSuspension.aspx (same).
284. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
286. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
287. Jim Camden, Order Puts Moratorium on Nonessential Rules: Stability for Businesses
Expected To Help State, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Nov. 18, 2010, at 7A (expressing
the business community’s concern that “[t]he potential exemptions are so broad that no one can
be sure” and that “‘[i]t’s practically impossible to figure out what the executive order will apply
to and what it won’t apply to’” (quoting Eric de Place of Sightline Institute, a sustainable-energy
organization)).
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moratorium.
Specifically,
Katzen
explained
the
Clinton
administration’s fears about protracted confusion as follows: “The
people who will be caught up in these debates are the same officials
who would otherwise spend their time working on substantive
288
solutions to the real problems with the regulatory system.” In other
words, if weeding out inefficient regulations and reforming the
regulatory system are truly top priorities, then spending time fighting
“about what is in or out of a moratorium” rather than focusing on
289
identifying ill-advised regulations may prove unproductive.
d. Evincing a Blunt Antiregulatory Bias. Yet another major
downside of hard moratoria is that they operate in a very blunt
manner, often demonstrating an antiregulatory bias that seems to
290
suggest that all regulations are inherently bad. Yet “not all
291
regulations are bad, nor are they all good.” Rather, regulations
seeking to ensure safe products, clean air and water, a healthy
economy, and equal opportunities in education, employment, and
housing “have the potential to be either” good or bad depending on
292
how they are crafted and chosen.
Given that regulations have the potential to be good or bad
depending on how they are crafted, halting the regulatory machinery
through a one-size-fits-all approach via a moratorium that would stop
“good regulations, bad regulations, [and] in between regulations”
293
makes little sense. In other words, simply assuming that less
regulation or the status quo—preserved through a moratorium—is
better than what the administration might produce in the future is
overly simplistic. If the goal is to avoid unnecessary and overly
burdensome regulations, then closely scrutinizing rules based on their
merits to make sure that the government regulates only when
appropriate and in a cost-effective manner makes much more sense.
This is the view that President Clinton took in 1995 when—in
speaking out against Republican leaders’ efforts to push through a

288. S. 219—Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, supra note 83, at 11 (statement of Sally
Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management
and Budget).
289. Id. at 8.
290. See id. at 11 (“[A] moratorium is a blunderbuss approach that delays rules based on
necessarily arbitrary categories . . . .”).
291. Id. at 6.
292. Id. at 8.
293. Id. at 6.

WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1936

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/12/2012 1:22 AM

[Vol. 61:1883

federal moratorium—he said that those pushing for a moratorium
294
“don’t want reform, they really want rigor mortis.”
In short, although “nameless ‘regulations’ may be a convenient
295
whipping boy” for those who want to avoid regulatory burdens,
hard regulatory moratoria are an ill-advised method of weeding out
unnecessary or overly burdensome regulations. Many other methods
of oversight and political control, including redrafting statutory
delegations to agencies, executive oversight via appointment and
removal powers, legislative hearings, and public participation through
notice-and-comment procedures, already exist and can be used to
296
help avoid improper regulations.
These methods of political
control—not the blunt, one-size-fits-all approach of a regulatory
moratorium, which assumes that the status quo is better than any
regulations the administration might produce in the future—should
be used to weed out bad regulations moving forward.
B. Soft Moratoria: A Potentially Useful Tool for Political Control by
the Executive Branch During Brief Periods of Political Transition
Unlike hard moratoria, which have little to commend them, soft
moratoria might well serve a very different and useful purpose:
enabling those newly in power to align the regulatory machinery with
their policy preferences—regardless of whether those policy
preferences are regulatory or deregulatory in nature—upon a change
in administration, thereby furthering principles of democratic
accountability.
1. The Main Benefit of Soft Moratoria: Aligning the Regulatory
Machinery with the New Administration’s Policies. As for the benefits
of regulatory moratoria, some of the same arguments considered in
Section A with respect to hard moratoria are relevant. For example,
political symbolism might well be at work in the context of soft
294. John M. Broder & Kelly Owen, Clinton Assails GOP Regulatory Proposal, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1995, at A16 (quoting President Clinton) (internal quotation mark omitted). Cass
Sunstein also has noted the “blunderbuss” nature of the moratorium proposed in 1995. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 247, 273 (1996) (“[A] general moratorium on federal regulation is reactionary in the
worst way—a crude, lazy, and pandering response to current problems. Its blunderbuss quality
ensures that it will stop measures that are otherwise required by law, or that would do a lot of
good, as well as measures that warrant reconsideration (which a moratorium by itself fails to
provide).”).
295. S. REP. NO. 104-15, at 26 (1995).
296. Cf. supra note 1.
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moratoria as it is in the context of hard moratoria. In addition,
proponents of soft moratoria—just like proponents of hard
moratoria—often justify moratoria as a means of achieving cost
298
savings, creating jobs, and giving the economy a boost, even though
these asserted cost savings and economic benefits generally have yet
to be proven via careful study.
Yet one additional reason that is lacking in the context of hard
moratoria does exist to support the imposition of soft moratoria: soft
moratoria, which are imposed at the beginning of a period of political
transition, give the new administration a brief transitional period
within which to ensure that midnight rules promulgated by the prior
administration are consistent with the policies of the new
administration, thereby furthering notions of democratic
accountability and political responsiveness.
Midnight rulemaking, which often occurs postelection at the
eleventh hour, is widely thought to represent “an illegitimate vehicle
for projecting an outgoing administration’s policy agenda beyond the
299
end of its term.” For one thing, as Professor Jack Beermann puts it,
a general discomfort seems to exist with the notion that a lame-duck,
outgoing administration might wait “until late in the term to take
politically controversial action or load[] up on late-term actions to
300
project its policy preferences in the future.” In addition, cynical
questions often arise about “why, if the regulation was deemed so
important, the administration failed to act during the previous three
301
or seven and three-quarters years.”
Yet even if this cynicism surrounding the motives behind
midnight rules is set to one side and even if one ascribes completely
honorable motives to the outgoing administration, midnight
rulemaking is still problematic for another even more important
297. See, e.g., Precious, supra note 10 (noting that Governor Pataki froze rulemaking in New
York, “[l]iving up to his campaign promise to be business friendly”).
298. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2011-001, at 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf
(“[S]uch an effort is timely given current unemployment levels and state budget difficulties, in
order to create economic opportunity for each and every New Mexican, while protecting and
preserving the health, safety and welfare of our community.”); Memorandum from Janice K.
Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting Dirs., supra note 139, at 342 (encouraging
agencies to act “in the interest of sound regulatory practice and the avoidance of costly,
burdensome, or unnecessary rules”).
299. Beermann, supra note 35, at 369.
300. Id. at 353.
301. Id.
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reason: it is difficult to square with scholars’ embrace of the “political
control” model of the administrative state, which legitimizes federal
agency action by stressing that agencies are subject to political
302
control. The political-control model “acknowledges that many
policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through
a myopic technocratic lens but rather are highly political decisions
303
that should be made by politically accountable institutions.” As
Professor Nina Mendelson explains, in embracing the political-control
model, scholars have relied “heavily upon the President as a major
source of democratic responsiveness and accountability,” and even
those scholars “who do not see presidential control as central see it as
304
a significant feature of a legitimate administrative state.”
When regulation occurs postelection, after voters have lost “an
305
important tool for holding agencies accountable,” the political306
control model breaks down. Enabling the incoming administration
to freeze the regulatory machinery via a soft moratorium upon
coming into office is one way to deal with this breakdown in political
accountability and responsiveness. Such soft moratoria empower new
chief executives to change course quickly from their predecessors and
to align the regulatory machinery with their policy preferences—
regardless of whether those policy preferences are deregulatory or
307
regulatory in nature.

302. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009) (describing the rise in the political-control model); see also
Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 580 (2003) (“[T]he dominant version of the principalagent approach to the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies is now the presidential
control model.”).
303. Watts, supra note 302, at 35.
304. Mendelson, supra note 302, at 567–68; cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).
305. Mendelson, supra note 302, at 566–67.
306. See id. (noting that postelection regulation raises concerns about democratic
responsiveness and legitimacy).
307. See Jack, supra note 13, at 1517 (noting that “[t]he continued use of rule withdrawals
and rule suspensions by incoming presidential administrations over the last twenty years
suggests these presidential directives are here to stay” and that “[t]hey will likely be used in
regulatory review plans by Republicans as well as Democrats, by administrations with a
deregulatory bias, as well as those administrations that have a favorable view of federal
regulations”).
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Given these important benefits relating to political accountability
308
and responsiveness that flow from soft moratoria, one can see why
soft moratoria have become so well entrenched at the federal level
during presidential transitions and why they have been used by
309
Democratic and Republican presidents alike. It also suggests that, at
the state level, incoming governors, regardless of party affiliation,
should consider soft moratoria as a potentially useful political tool
rather than leaving the tool primarily in the hands of Republican
governors who seek to push a deregulatory agenda, as has been the
trend in the states.
2. The Major Risks of Soft Moratoria. Despite the significant
value of enabling political control and furthering democratic
accountability at the beginning of a new administration, soft
moratoria raise a variety of risks, including legal questions about
whether the executive branch possesses the authority to order even a
temporary suspension of rulemaking at the start of a new
administration. In addition, soft moratoria also raise (1) transparency
concerns, (2) the potential for regulatory confusion, and (3) the risk
that soft moratoria will morph into hard moratoria. Some of these
downsides of soft moratoria, including the legal issues, concerns
about transparency, and the potential for regulatory confusion, are
similar to the risks facing hard moratoria, yet—as this Section
discusses—soft moratoria can overcome these potential risks more
easily than hard moratoria can.
a. Inviting Legal Costs. One major concern surrounding soft
moratoria—as is the case with hard moratoria—has to do with the

308. This is not to suggest that soft moratoria are the only way that an incoming
administration could be empowered to deal with midnight rulemaking, but rather that soft
moratoria are a viable and well-entrenched tool for empowering a new chief executive. Other
tools that might empower the incoming administration should be explored as well. See, e.g.,
Beermann, supra note 35, at 354–59 (discussing the Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th Cong.
(2009), a bill proposed in Congress that would have given the incoming administration the
power to disapprove of regulations adopted during the last ninety days of the outgoing
administration); Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark? In Favor of Empowering the
President-Elect, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 468–72 (2009), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/19/LRColl2009n19Mendelson.pdf (exploring the
possibility of statutory amendments that would increase a president-elect’s power).
309. See Ari Cuenin, Note, Mooting the Night Away: Postinauguration Midnight-Rule
Changes and Vacatur for Mootness, 60 DUKE L.J. 453, 478 (2010) (“[T]hese suspension and
withdrawal memoranda are frequently suggested to new presidents as one of the most effective
means for handling midnight regulations.”).
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various legal challenges that could arise, especially over separationof-powers concerns. Depending on the specific terms of a soft
moratorium, a variety of legal issues might arise, including whether
the new chief executive can order (1) a freeze on new rules, (2) the
withdrawal of final rules after they have been sent for publication but
before actual publication, or (3) the postponement of the effective
dates of final rules that already have been published. Although these
potential legal issues all deserve consideration, none seems to doom
the legality of soft moratoria, especially if careful drafting is used.
i. Separation-of-Powers Questions Stemming from a Freeze on
New Rules. An executive-driven soft moratorium calling for a
general freeze on all new rules during a political transition could
potentially trigger constitutional separation-of-powers questions
under applicable federal or state law similar to the separation-of310
powers questions raised by hard executive moratoria. At least at the
311
federal level, however, soft moratoria ordered by newly elected
presidents likely would pass constitutional muster, for at least two
reasons.
First, and most importantly, soft moratoria, unlike hard
moratoria, are limited in duration to brief periods of political
transition. They are designed not to halt rulemaking for extended
periods of time but rather simply to enable the newly elected
president—exercising his constitutionally granted powers to appoint
officers—to get his appointees in place before the regulatory
312
machinery moves forward. In this sense, one can hardly say that soft
moratoria enable the president to decide the substance of regulatory
decisions delegated by Congress to agency actors by locking into
place the status quo. Rather, soft moratoria merely enable the
president to effectuate his appointment powers by staffing the
executive branch with his appointees prior to allowing new
rulemakings to continue. Hence, even if—contrary to the unitaryexecutive theory—the president merely has the power to oversee

310. See supra notes 241–75 and accompanying text.
311. At the state level, the answer could be different
constitutional and statutory requirements.
312. The president’s appointment powers are spelled
Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
for . . . .”).

depending on each state’s own
out in the Constitution in the
(“[The President] shall appoint
the supreme Court, and all other
not herein otherwise provided
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administrative action but not to decide the substance of decisions
delegated to agency officials by law, a temporary freeze of
discretionary rulemaking would not seem to cross the line from
313
overseeing to deciding the substance of regulatory actions.
Second, a soft moratorium could be viewed as a mere request,
rather than a command that new rules be put on hold during the
314
political transition. Even though agency heads likely feel significant
pressure to comply with the president’s wishes, particularly at the
beginning of a new administration, if the agency ultimately complies
with the president’s wishes and puts the new rules on hold, then the
president will not have violated the law by somehow usurping the
agency’s power or by deciding for himself the substance of regulatory
decisions delegated to the agency by Congress.
Finally, another reason—albeit a much more controversial and
less persuasive reason—for concluding that soft moratoria are
constitutional at the federal level would be to say that the practice has
gained constitutional legitimacy through the entrenched practice of
315
presidents’ coming into office and freezing new rules. After all,
Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama all
imposed a temporary freeze on new rules upon coming into the White
House. For those who are willing to apply the logic of this kind of
316
“constitutional adverse possession,” the fact that four of five
consecutive presidents have temporarily suspended rulemaking while
getting their appointees into place would likely help to legitimate soft
moratoria at the federal level. Needless to say, however, this
acquiescence argument is not a slam dunk. Take, for example, the
one- and two-house vetoes, which the Supreme Court found
317
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha despite the fact that they had

313. Cf. supra note 261 and accompanying text.
314. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“requesting” that agencies take the steps outlined in the
memorandum).
315. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to
uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of
Art. II.”).
316. See William A. Eskridge, Jr., Sodomy and Guns: Tradition as Democratic Deliberation
and Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 203–09 (2008) (discussing
the notion of “constitutional adverse possession” and its pitfalls).
317. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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been employed by Congress for decades prior to the Supreme Court’s
318
striking them down.
ii. The Legality of Ordering the Withdrawal of Final Regulations
After They Have Been Sent for Publication but Before Actual
Publication. Another legal question that could crop up with respect
to soft moratoria is whether the new chief executive may permissibly
order the withdrawal of final regulations prior to publication.
319
320
321
Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, as well as
322
323
governors in Arizona and New Jersey, have all ordered agencies
to initiate these sorts of rule withdrawals prior to publication of the
324
final rules.

318. See id. at 955–60 (discussing narrow situations in which Congress can act unicamerally
and holding the one-house veto unconstitutional).
319. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section
1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993) (“[Agency heads] are
requested to withdraw from the Federal Register for approval [by an agency head appointed by
President Clinton] . . . all regulations that have not yet been published in the Federal
Register . . . .”).
320. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (“With respect to regulations that have been
sent to the [Office of the Federal Register (OFR)] but not published in the Federal Register,
withdraw them from OFR for review and approval [by an agency head appointed by President
Bush] . . . .”).
321. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Withdraw from the OFR all proposed or final regulations that have
not been published in the Federal Register so that they can be reviewed and approved by a
department or agency head [appointed by President Obama] . . . .”).
322. See Memorandum from Janice K. Brewer, Governor, to State Agency Dirs. & Acting
Dirs., supra note 139 (“With respect to proposed rules that have been sent to the Secretary of
State but not published in the Arizona Administrative Register, withdraw them from the
Secretary of State.”).
323. See Exec. Order. No. 1 para. 2 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/info
bank/circular/eocc1.pdf (“With respect to any proposed administrative regulation or rule that
may have been transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, but has not been published in
the New Jersey Register, the head of the State agency proposing the regulation or rule shall
withdraw the proposed regulation or rule in a manner consistent with the Rules for Agency
Rulemaking and procedures of the Office of Administrative Law.”).
324. The withdrawal involved an unpublished proposed rule—as opposed to a final rule—
that seemed to be legally permissible. See A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act
and Recent Federal Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. &
Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 121–22 (2001) (prepared
statement of Thomas O. McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair, University of Texas School of
Law) (noting that the withdrawal of unpublished proposed rules at the beginning of the Bush
administration was likely legal because most rulemakings are not commenced until notice is
actually published in accordance with section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000)).

WATTS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

REGULATORY MORATORIA

4/12/2012 1:22 AM

1943

Although the question is complicated, this kind of a command to
agencies might withstand legal scrutiny at the federal level. In
particular, support for agencies’ power to withdraw unpublished rules
can be found in a D.C. Circuit opinion, which held that an agency has
the power to withdraw its rule from the Federal Register before the
rule has been made public and during the three-day confidential
325
processing period. Although the D.C. Circuit opinion left open the
question of whether an agency may withdraw an unpublished rule
after the confidential processing period but before publication, the
Office of the Federal Register (OFR) has taken the view that
agencies have the right to withdraw documents that have been filed
for public inspection but that have not yet been published by the
326
OFR. Hence, one commentator—relying heavily upon the OFR’s
own views and the fact that the OFR’s views might receive deference
from the courts—concludes that the withdrawal of unpublished final
and proposed rules, even after the OFR has made them available for
327
public inspection, “appears to be valid.” In addition, in a statement
before Congress after the Bush transition in 2001, Professor Thomas
McGarity expressed his view that “it is legally permissible for the
agency that sent the rule to the [OFR] to withdraw the submission” so
long as the signed rule had not yet been published in the Federal
328
Register.
Nonetheless, reason for caution still exists at the federal level. In
particular, in one case, a federal district court concluded that a rule
conferring a substantive benefit became final once it had been signed
329
by the agency and sent to the Federal Register. Although the Second
Circuit reversed, it did so on the ground that the signed final rule
stated that it was to be effective upon publication in the Federal

325. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
326. 1 C.F.R. § 18.13 (2011) (“A document that has been filed for public inspection with the
Office of the Federal Register but not yet published, may be withdrawn from publication or
corrected by the submitting agency.”).
327. Jack, supra note 13, at 1494–95.
328. A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations,
supra note 324, at 123 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair,
University of Texas School of Law).
329. See Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[W]here a rule
confers a substantive benefit to a person, an agency must comply with it, even if the rule is not
published.”), rev’d sub nom. Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Register and that the required publication had not yet occurred.
Hence, this holding left open the possibility that a rule designed to
confer a benefit could be treated as effective and enforced against the
government if the rule’s effective date precedes publication.
In addition, at the state level, a decision by the Supreme Court of
331
New Mexico in 2011, New Energy Economy, Inc. v. Martinez,
provides reason for caution. The case involved a regulation
promulgated by the Environmental Improvement Board after a twoyear rulemaking process and regulations promulgated by the Water
332
Quality Control Commission after a one-year rulemaking process.
Both rules had been transmitted to the State Records Center and
Archives (Records Center) for filing and publication, and both had
been slated for publication in the January 14, 2011, edition of the New
333
Mexico Register. On January 1, 2011, however, newly elected
Governor Martinez suspended rulemaking in the state for ninety
334
days. After correspondence between the Records Center and the
governor’s office, the acting cabinet secretary of the New Mexico
Environment Department gave the Records Center written
335
notification that it was not to publish the regulations. Proponents of
the rules then filed suit, arguing that a writ of mandamus was
336
appropriate to order publication of the regulations. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico agreed, finding that the state records
administrator had a clear, indisputable, and nondiscretionary duty
under state law to publish the regulations notwithstanding the
337
regulatory freeze imposed by the governor. Hence, the case suggests
that drafters of soft moratoria in the states should carefully consult
state law when deciding whether to call upon agencies to suspend the
publication of unpublished rules after they have been sent to the state
register. If the law is unclear, the safest route when crafting a soft

330. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 749 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the effective date of
the rule was timed to publication), superseded on other grounds by statute, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2006)).
331. New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286 (N.M. 2011).
332. Id. at 288.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 288–89.
336. Id. at 289.
337. Id. at 293.
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moratorium would be to leave untouched unpublished regulations
after they have been sent for publication.
iii. The Legality of Suspending the Effective Date of a Final,
Published Regulation. Yet another legal question that has plagued
the use of some soft moratoria at the federal level is whether it is legal
to order the suspension of final, published agency regulations prior to
338
their effective dates, as Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush did
339
when coming into office. The basic issue boils down to this: Can an
agency delay a notice-and-comment rule prior to its effective date
without going through notice-and-comment procedures? Or is the
delay itself a rule that is subject to notice-and-comment
requirements? Some cases involving interpretations of the federal
340
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) touch on these questions at
the federal level. These cases demonstrate that the delay of a final,
published rule constitutes a “rule” within the meaning of the APA
and hence requires that notice and comment be allowed before
341
delaying the effective date of the rule, unless one of the APA’s
exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking applies, such as the
342
procedural-rule exemption or the “good cause” exemption.

338. There seems to be no question that agencies can legally withdraw published proposed
rules. See A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations,
supra note 324, at 122 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair,
University of Texas School of Law) (noting that there is “probably no legal impediment to
withdrawing a published notice of proposed rulemaking”).
339. See Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (“To the extent permitted by law, your agency shall, by
notice in the Federal Register, postpone for 60 days from the date of this memorandum the
effective date of all regulations that your agency has promulgated in final form and that are
scheduled to become effective during such 60-day period.”); Memorandum for the Heads and
Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001)
(asking agency heads, “[w]ith respect to regulations that have been published in the OFR but
have not taken effect, temporarily [to] postpone the effective date of the regulations for 60
days”).
340. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
341. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 761 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We
conclude that, under the facts of this case, EPA’s action in indefinitely postponing the effective
date of the amendments fit the definition of ‘rule’ in the APA, and, as such, was subject to the
APA’s rulemaking requirements.”); Council of S. Mountains v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 580–82
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing how deferring the implementation of regulations generally requires
notice-and-comment procedures); see also JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL
AGENCY RULEMAKING 119–20 (4th ed. 2006) (“[R]egardless of the duration of a
postponement, a delay of a rule’s effective date is normally considered a ‘rule’ within the
meaning of the APA so as to require notice-and-comment rulemaking.”).
342. See APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (exempting procedural rules and rules for which
there is “good cause,” such as impracticability).
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One commentator concludes that the federal APA’s proceduralrule exemption might exempt certain, but not all, brief rule delays
from notice-and-comment requirements because the brief delay of
some rules might not affect the rights and interests of private
343
parties. In addition, another commentator asserts that a brief delay
in a rule’s effective date might be permissible even without noticeand-comment procedures by relying upon the APA’s good-cause
exception, as requiring an agency to hold notice and comment on a
decision about whether to delay a rule before running up against its
344
effective date might be impractical in some circumstances. In his
statement to Congress in 2001, however, Professor McGarity
concluded that neither exemption could be used to avoid notice-andcomment procedures when delaying the effective date of a final,
345
published rule.
Hence, in light of these unresolved and complicated legal
questions, cautious drafters of soft moratoria might choose not to
order the suspension of the effective date of final, published rules to
346
avoid the threat of legal challenges. This strategy is what President
Clinton pursued. When he came into office, he ordered a freeze on
new rules and the withdrawal of rules that had not yet been
347
published, but—unlike Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush —
348
he did not order the suspension of already-published, final rules.

343. See Jack, supra note 13, at 1505–08 (concluding that some but not all rule suspensions
made by the Bush administration pursuant to the Card Memorandum, Memorandum for the
Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24,
2001), may have fallen within the APA’s procedural-rule exemption because the temporary
delay might not have substantially affected private parties’ interest in the final rule).
344. See Beermann, supra note 13, at 983 & n.120 (noting that the good-cause exemption
should support sixty-day delays). But see Jack, supra note 13, at 1515–17 (concluding that
agencies should give notice and an opportunity to comment on rule delays and that a generic
invocation of “good cause” should not suffice to avoid notice and comment).
345. A Rush To Regulate—The Congressional Review Act and Recent Federal Regulations,
supra note 324, at 125 (prepared statement of Thomas McGarity, W. James Kronzer Chair,
University of Texas School of Law); see also Sanford, supra note 13, at 801–07 (arguing that in
the wake of the Card Memorandum issued under the Bush administration, agencies could not
legally delay the effective dates of regulations that had already been published because the
delays had substantive impact and triggered an obligation for agencies to give adequate reasons
for the delays under arbitrary-and-capricious review).
346. Because states have their own administrative-procedure acts, the analysis at the state
level could differ depending on the state and its requirements.
347. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
348. See Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in Section
1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993).
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Alternatively, if the drafter of a soft moratorium wishes to call
for the suspension of the effective date of final rules after publication,
then limiting the potential delay to a brief sixty-day period, as the text
of both President Reagan’s and President Bush’s memoranda did,
349
would be wise. In addition, to further reduce the likelihood of legal
challenges, drafters of soft moratoria might consider following in the
footsteps of President Obama. His regulatory-review memorandum
made the suspension of final rules permissive by directing agencies
merely to “[c]onsider extending for 60 days the effective date of
regulations that have been published in the Federal Register but not
yet taken effect . . . for the purpose of reviewing questions of law and
350
policy raised by those regulations.” In addition, it expressly directed
that if an agency were to choose to extend the effective dates of
regulations, then the agency should “immediately reopen the noticeand-comment period for 30 days to allow interested parties to provide
351
comments about issues of law and policy raised by those rules.”
Furthermore, Peter Orszag, the director of OMB under President
Obama, issued a clarifying memorandum to agency heads at the
outset of the Obama administration, noting, “If you determine that
you want to extend the effective date for purposes of enabling further
review, you should promptly provide a 30-day notice-and-comment
period, seeking public comment about both your contemplated
352
extension of the effective date and the rule in question.” If the rule at
issue would “take effect before there [had been] sufficient time to
solicit and review comments on the extension of the effective date,”
then Orszag directed agencies to “consult immediately with [the
Office of Legal Counsel] and OIRA about the appropriate course of
353
action.”
b. Undermining Transparency. Another concern surrounding
soft moratoria—as with hard moratoria—is that they suffer from a
349. See Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (postponing effectiveness of published rules for sixty
days); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (same).
350. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435, 4435–36 (Jan. 26, 2009).
351. Id.
352. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of
the President, to the Heads & Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/agencyinformation_
memoranda_2009_pdf/m09-08.pdf (emphasis added).
353. Id.
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lack of transparency and openness, not only from the public’s
perspective but also perhaps from the new administration’s
perspective. For example, as Professor Beermann notes, after
President George W. Bush implemented a soft moratorium at the
beginning of his administration pursuant to what is called the Card
355
Memorandum, it was “unclear how many such rules there were, and
because they had not yet been published, no sign of them appear[ed]
356
in the Federal Register itself.” Nor were there “any documents in
the Federal Register that reflect[ed] the withdrawal of a submitted
but unpublished rule or proposal, or a decision not to publish a rule
357
so as to comply with” the Card Memorandum. Indeed, OMB
admitted in February 2001 that “it did not know how many rules were
delayed, or how many rules were exempted from the Card
Memorandum because of judicial or statutory deadlines, or
358
emergency situations relating to health and safety.” The “only
information available on the identity, number, and character of
delayed rules came from” a General Accounting Office report
359
published in February 2002 as a result of congressional oversight.
In the context of soft moratoria, this lack of openness and
transparency is troubling for two reasons. First, if a new
administration lacks an organized system for tracking rules affected
by and exempted from a soft moratorium, it will find it difficult to
“oversee and monitor the implementation of [its] regulatory
360
review” effectively, thereby undercutting the usefulness of soft
moratoria as a tool for political control. Second, from the public’s
perspective, the lack of transparency could undermine perceptions
about the validity of the regulatory process.
As with hard moratoria, however, these transparency-related
concerns could be remedied through disclosure requirements that
354. See supra notes 276–81 and accompanying text; see also Jack, supra note 13, at 1512–14
(describing the lack of transparency characterizing President George W. Bush’s regulatory
review at the beginning of his administration).
355. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
356. Beermann, supra note 13, at 991.
357. Id.
358. Jack, supra note 13, at 1513.
359. Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-370R, REGULATORY
REVIEW: DELAY OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S
JANUARY 20, 2001, MEMORANDUM (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02370r
.pdf).
360. Id. at 1514.
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would force disclosure and enable greater oversight. For example,
federal agencies that are subject to soft moratoria could be required
to publish in the Federal Register “a list of the regulations that either
are not sent to or are withdrawn from OFR following a presidential
361
transition,” as well as a list of any rules whose effective dates are
delayed. Likewise, state agencies could be required to publish a list of
affected regulations in their state’s administrative register.
c. Creating a Risk of Some Regulatory Confusion. Yet another
problem facing soft moratoria—one also relevant to hard moratoria—
is that confusion is likely to surface surrounding the meaning and
362
scope of any moratorium. After Governor Schwarzenegger initiated
a temporary rulemaking freeze in California upon coming into office,
for example, confusion erupted over whether the regulatory
moratorium would “delay or alter a law requiring greater water
efficiency for California clothes washers, which could keep the state
363
from saving billions of gallons in water use.” Although these
concerns about regulatory confusion are very real, they seem much
less acute in the context of soft moratoria than in that of hard
moratoria. This is because soft moratoria, by their terms, are keyed to
brief periods of political transition, such as sixty- or ninety-day
364
periods or until an agency head appointed by the newly elected
365
chief executive has authorized the new rules to move forward.
Hence, unlike hard moratoria, soft moratoria should not pose a
significant risk of protracted, lengthy confusion.

361. Gale Lea Rubrecht, President Obama Halts Midnight Regulations, 24 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 47, 49 (2009).
362. See supra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.
363. Anna Oberthur, Order May Delay Water-Saving Clothes Washer Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sdcwa.org/clips/2003/dec/121403/121403ordermay
delay.html.
364. See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 26, at 63 (directing agencies to refrain for sixty days from
promulgating any new rules).
365. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (ordering agencies to refrain from sending any proposed or final
regulations to the Federal Register unless they have been approved by an appointee of President
Obama); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (ordering agencies to send no proposed or
final regulations to the Federal Register unless they have been approved by an appointee of
President Bush); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Agencies Described in
Section 1(d) of Executive Order 12291, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074, 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993) (directing that no
proposed or final regulations should be sent to the Federal Register for publication unless they
have been approved by an appointee of President Clinton).
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d. The Blurring of Soft and Hard Moratoria. Still another
concern surrounding soft moratoria is that either their duration will
be longer than necessary to effectuate a smooth change in political
administration or they will easily morph from soft moratoria into hard
moratoria. An example of the former problem occurred in California,
where Governor Schwarzenegger put a six-month freeze on
366
rulemaking in the state upon coming into office. Examples of the
latter problem can be found in New York, where Governor Pataki
initially announced a ninety-day rulemaking freeze keyed to his
entrance into office but then later repeatedly extended the
367
moratorium, as well as in Arizona, where a combination of
legislative and executive action turned what began as a limited three368
month rulemaking freeze into a multiyear moratorium.
Furthermore, some soft moratoria have poorly defined end
dates, ordering agencies to avoid promulgating any new rules until
the rules have been approved by an agency head appointed by the
369
incoming administration. As one commentator notes in the context
of President George W. Bush’s moratorium, this approach leaves the
duration of any freeze somewhat open-ended because the freeze may
be, for example, contingent on “how fast agency appointees can be
vetted, approved with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
caught up to speed on pending proposed or final rules within their
370
agencies.”
The easiest way to minimize these sorts of problems would be to
ensure that soft moratoria are defined in terms of a specific number
of days. Given that the goal of a soft moratorium is simply to enable
the incoming administration to align the regulatory machinery with its
policy preferences, a sixty- or ninety-day freeze on new rules
generally should prove sufficient. Indeed, a sixty-day period would be
in line with some of the provisions found in federal moratoria ordered
by incoming presidents, such as Reagan, who put a freeze on new
371
rules for a sixty-day period upon coming into the White House, and
George W. Bush, who ordered agencies to suspend for sixty days the
effective dates of regulations that had been published in the Federal

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139–40, 176–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
Jack, supra note 13, at 1514–15 (footnote omitted).
Reagan, supra note 26, at 63.
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Register but that were not yet final. Alternatively, a ninety-day
period would be consistent with—or longer than—soft moratoria
373
implemented in some states.
In an effort to resolve these sorts of issues in a uniform manner,
one solution that warrants future consideration would be the
enactment of permanent congressional legislation establishing a soft
moratorium at the beginning of new presidential terms to enable the
incoming administration to review any midnight rules and compare
374
them with the policies of the incoming administration. Such
legislation could clearly specify the period of time available for review
of midnight rules by the new administration—for example, sixty or
ninety days—thereby eliminating concerns that soft moratoria might
drag out too long or morph into hard moratoria. In addition, such
legislation could incorporate transparency requirements, ensuring
that soft moratoria are implemented in an open manner. Such
legislation also would help to settle any constitutional separation-ofpowers questions that might hover over executive-driven moratoria.
This is because the legislature itself, not the executive, would be the
body electing to turn soft moratoria into a normal, expected part of
375
the transitional process.

372. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
373. See Exec. Order No. 1 para. 1 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nj.gov/info
bank/circular/eocc1.pdf (ordering a ninety-day freeze); Exec. Order No. 95-3 para. 1 (R.I. Jan.
25, 1995), available at http://www.uri.edu/library/special_collections/almond/execord/95-03.html
(same); Exec. Order No. 2011-001, at 1 (N.M. Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
governor.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/1e77a5621a1544e28318ba93fcd47d49/EO-2011-001.pdf
(determining that “ninety days is a reasonable time to review such proposed and pending rules
and regulations, to examine them from various perspectives as to their workability,
reasonableness, and determine whether they are proper and necessary”); Press Release,
Governor Bill Haslam, supra note 153 (ordering a forty-five-day freeze). But see Exec. Order
No. S-2-03 para. 1(b) (Cal. Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/executiveorder/3381 (ordering a 180-day freeze).
374. If the legislation were to work at the federal level, the idea could be copied at the state
level, perhaps with the assistance of a model state act.
375. At least one bill has been proposed in Congress seeking the establishment of soft
moratoria at the beginning of new presidential terms. See Midnight Rule Act, H.R. 34, 111th
Cong. (2009) (proposing that “a midnight rule shall not take effect until 90 days after the agency
head is appointed by the new President”). But that bill was written in fairly sweeping terms and,
if enacted, would have raised many problems. See Beermann, supra note 35, at 354–59 (detailing
defects in H.R. 34, such as the fact that the proposed bill contemplated a blanket delay on
midnight rules and did not provide “exceptions for instances in which the incoming
administration would rather have the midnight rules go into effect”).
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III. ISSUES FOR FUTURE STUDY
Hopefully, the cautionary tale that has just been told about
regulatory moratoria will start prompting greater dialogue about the
legality and wisdom of imposing regulatory moratoria and about the
different contexts in which moratoria have been and should be used.
Yet it is just a start. Many questions remain unresolved and call out
for future study. Two such questions are highlighted here.
First, one significant question in need of future study involves
looking at what, if any, impact regulatory moratoria—particularly
hard moratoria lasting at least one year—have had on regulatory
activity. As noted in Part II, even though politicians repeatedly point
to the cost savings yielded by regulatory moratoria, scholars know
376
very little about the actual impact of regulatory moratoria. For
example, when President Bush implemented the one-year federal
regulatory moratorium in 1992, did the number of rules produced
actually go down? When President Bush claimed in 1992 that the
efforts put into motion by his regulatory moratorium would save
377
378
billions per year, was he correct? Or were public-interest groups
correct that his claims were based on “voodoo accounting” and that
the moratorium was actually costing the country dearly in terms of
379
harm to the environment and human health? And with regard to
hard moratoria in states such as Arizona and Washington, has
regulatory activity decreased? Have cost savings occurred?
Given the lack of attention that has been paid to regulatory
moratoria in general, the fact that few researchers have looked at
these sorts of questions is unsurprising. And the scholars who have
considered these questions have barely scratched the surface. For
example, Professor Scott Furlong’s 1995 article, which studies the
impact of President Bush’s 1992 moratorium from the perspective of
the number of rules produced, “says nothing about the actual impact

376. See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
377. Bush, supra note 51, at 664.
378. See generally Rosenbaum & Schneider, supra note 46 (quoting a senior Senate staff
assistant, who said that explaining what the moratorium had done would be “impossible”
because “[t]he Federal river is awfully wide” and a person “just can’t be sure” when “saying that
such-and-such happened or didn’t happen because of the moratorium” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
379. WATZMAN & TRIANO, supra note 60, at i, v (calling President Bush’s cost-saving claims
“voodoo accounting” and arguing that “the regulatory moratorium is costing the nation dearly
in human life and a damaged environment”).
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Hence, Professor
of not promulgating certain regulations.”
Furlong’s inquiry is limited to looking at rulemaking output, not other
potential measures of impact. In addition, a 2010 report briefly notes
Arizona’s experiment with a moratorium and concludes, based on
surveys completed by agency administrators within the state, that
even though “some agencies [in Arizona] have utilized the public
381
health and safety exception to pass a few rules,” other agencies feel
that “[t]he moratorium has stunted [their] ability . . . to conduct
382
rulemakings” in the state. Yet the report is limited in that it
discusses only Arizona’s moratorium and relies only on survey results
rather than on any kind of empirical analysis to assess the impact of
Arizona’s moratorium.
Given that numerous states have experimented with regulatory
moratoria, researchers should look to the states as laboratories and
try to analyze the impact of regulatory moratoria. States that have
implemented hard moratoria, such as Washington, Nevada, and
Arizona, present researchers with a unique opportunity to study these
questions through a set of natural experiments. If these regulatory
moratoria are studied and the results ultimately show that the hard
moratoria have had little impact on regulatory activity, then hard
regulatory moratoria could more easily be dismissed as nothing more
than mere symbolic tools used to curry political favor and to signal
that a politician is tough on government regulation.
Another issue crying out for more scholarly attention is the issue
of state-level regulatory review and reform. In contrast to their
understanding of regulatory-reform efforts occurring at the federal
level, scholars know very little about what is going on in the states in
terms of regulatory review and reform or what themes might be
383
emerging in the states. Granted, attention is sometimes given to

380. Furlong, supra note 14, at 257.
381. JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH
REGULATORY REVIEW: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE RULEMAKINGS
159 (2010), available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experiments_with_
Regulatory_Review.pdf.
382. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Casey Cullings, Arizona Department of
Agriculture).
383. Cf. id. at v (“[T]he central theme of this report is that state regulatory review structures
are powerful, poorly understood, and deserve much more attention than they have received to
date.”); Rossi, supra note 16, at 553 (“[C]asebooks, treatises, and scholarship harbor a heavy
bias towards federal administrative law, relegating state administrative procedure little, if any,
serious attention.”). But see MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 473–75 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing state executive-review programs).
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regulatory oversight and reform efforts occurring in one isolated state
384
or another. But what has generally been missing is serious scholarly
effort to study systematically state-level regulatory-review efforts.
Much room remains for future scholars to look for emerging trends
across all the states and to analyze how those patterns do or do not fit
385
within themes identified at the federal level.
Of course, one major hurdle that stands in the way of remedying
this lack of attention paid to state-level regulatory reform is the
386
relative difficulty of gathering state-level information. In writing this
Article, for example, it became clear that no easily searchable
387
electronic database of all state executive orders or directives exists.
384. See, e.g., Barbara L. Borden, Legislative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: A
Constitutional Analysis, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493 (“This comment analyzes Arizona’s existing
legislative review procedure and a recent proposal for legislative oversight.”); Jonathan Rose,
Executive Oversight of Rulemaking in Arizona: The Governor’s Regulatory Review Council—
The First Three Years, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425 (“Th[is] article will describe the establishment,
operation, and effect of the [Governor’s Regulatory Review Council] during its first three
years . . . .”).
385. A few notable exceptions do exist. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 381 (studying regulatory
review in the fifty states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, in a report spanning
more than four hundred pages); Brian J. Gerber, Cherie Maestas & Nelson C. Dometrius, State
Legislative Influence over Agency Rulemaking: The Utility of Ex Ante Review, 5 ST. POL. &
POL’Y Q. 24 (2005) (studying legislative review of agency rule proposals “[u]sing data from a
1994 survey of top agency administrators in the 50 states”); Hahn, supra note 16 (studying state
and federal regulatory reform from a comparative perspective); Patty D. Renfrow & David J.
Houston, A Comparative Analysis of Rulemaking Provisions in State Administrative Procedure
Acts, 6 POL’Y STUD. REV. 657 (1987) (comparing provisions of state administrative-procedure
acts). Nevertheless, these projects studying state-level regulatory review and reform are the
exception, not the norm. In addition, many of these studies are now dated or rely on old data.
Even the 2010 report published by Jason Schwartz, supra note 381—which appears to be the
most comprehensive and the most current study of state-level regulatory review—is already
dated, see id. at 77 (“[T]his report can only claim reasonable accuracy and comprehensiveness
through January 2010.”). It does not cover, for example, the numerous regulatory moratoria
that occurred in the states after early 2010. Indeed, Arizona is the only state with a generalized
regulatory moratorium discussed in the report. See id. at 159 (“On January 22, 2009, in her first
official act as governor, Governor Jan Brewer issued a moratorium on all rulemaking
activities.”).
386. See Hahn, supra note 16, at 3 (noting in a report studying state and federal regulatory
reform that “identification of state regulatory reform provisions was difficult because no
comprehensive source of data exists” and that compiling state information made it “necessary to
interview state officials in all states, acquire and analyze available state information, search state
web pages, and use survey data”); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 381, at ii (noting that in order
to compile a report on regulatory review in the states, “dozens of researchers at New York
University School of Law” had to study “the laws and regulations governing agency
decisionmaking in all 50 states, plus Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico” and also administer and
collect surveys in the states).
387. Westlaw does offer a state executive-order database. It is labeled “Netscan Executive
Orders” on Westlaw and can be found using “NS-EO” as the database identifier. According to
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Moving forward, states will need to adopt clearer, more uniform rules
for dealing with the publication and archiving of state executive
orders and other materials involving regulatory review. If this shift
occurs, and if more and more states make such information readily
available electronically, state-level research should become easier,
enabling more scholars to conduct comparative state-federal research
in the regulatory arena in the future.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that when one looks at
both the federal and the state landscape, one realizes that—far from
being an isolated or novel concept—regulatory moratoria have
worked their way into the political toolbox. This Article, however,
suggests the need for caution toward regulatory moratoria and warns
that not all moratoria are created equal. Soft moratoria—like those
used by Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama
when they entered office and by governors in New Jersey, New
Mexico, Tennessee, and other states—might appropriately further
notions of democratic accountability when carefully crafted and used
for limited periods following a change in administration.
Hard moratoria, however, which are designed to freeze
rulemaking for extended periods of time—such as President George
H.W. Bush’s one-year moratorium in 1992, Washington state’s twoyear suspension of noncritical rulemaking, and Arizona’s multiyear
rulemaking freeze—are highly problematic. Apart from raising
questions about whether hard moratoria actually yield cost savings
and economic benefits, such long-term moratoria also evince an
antiregulatory bias that bluntly targets all regulation as inherently
bad. Furthermore, far from leading to a predictable regulatory
climate, hard moratoria are likely to lead to protracted regulatory
confusion. In addition, as the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Whiley v. Scott demonstrates, executive-driven hard moratoria
threaten to raise separation-of-powers concerns and other legal
questions surrounding the executive’s authority to suspend
rulemaking. Hard moratoria, accordingly, have little to commend
them other than mere political symbolism.

Westlaw, the database, which is produced from electronic data transmissions provided by
NETSCAN, does not begin coverage until 2008, and the database proved difficult to use
effectively.

